Incident Chronology of Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, 2005-2009

 A Chronology of events and incidents at Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Delta, Pa. 

 

Feb. 7, 2005

Peach Bottom Unit 2 shuts down for valve replacement

 

Chicago-based energy company Exelon Corp.'s 1,110-megawatt Unit 2 reactor at the Peach Bottom nuclear station in Pennsylvania exited a work outage and ramped up to full power by early Monday, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission said in its power reactor status report.

The company shut the unit on Feb. 2 to replace a safety relief valve.

The 2,220 MW Peach Bottom station is located in Peach Bottom, Pennsylvania, about 75 miles southwest of Philadelphia. There are two 1,110 MW units 2 and 3 at Peach Bottom.

Unit 3, meanwhile, continued to operate at full power.

One megawatt powers about 1,000 homes, according to the North American average.

Exelon Nuclear, a unit of Exelon's Exelon Generation subsidiary, operates the station for its owners: Exelon (50 percent) and New Jersey-based energy company Public Service Enterprise Group Inc. (PSEG) (50 percent).

In December 2004, Exelon agreed to acquire PSEG. Pending regulatory and shareholder approvals, the companies expect to complete the deal in 2006.

 -Report from Rueters

 

 

Feb. 9, 2005 

Peach Bottom Unit 2 back in production 

 

Chicago-based energy company Exelon Corp.'s  1,110-megawatt Unit 2 at the Peach Bottom nuclear station in Pennsylvania ramped up to 94 percent of capacity by early Wednesday, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission said in its power reactor status report.

 

On Tuesday, the unit was operating at 64 percent of capacity as it increased power following a planned control rod pattern adjustment.

The company performed the rod pattern adjustment to optimize the efficiency of the fuel in the reactor after the reactor exited an outage started on Feb. 2 to replace a safety relief valve.

The 2,220 MW Peach Bottom station is located in Peach Bottom, Pennsylvania, about 75 miles southwest of Philadelphia. There are two 1,110 MW units 2 and 3 at Peach Bottom.

Unit 3, meanwhile, continued to operate at full power.One megawatt powers about 1,000 homes, according to the North American average.

-Report from Rueters

 

Feb. 11, 2005

Nuclear plant guard rule could be year away

TMI watchdog group decries 'glacier' pace 

The Harrisburg-based nuclear watchdog group Three Mile Island Alert has been waiting since Sept. 12, 2001, for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission to decide whether nuclear plant owners must post armed guards at their front gates. 

TMIA will have to wait another year for its answer, according to an NRC memo released to Wednesday. The memo outlines a schedule the NRC plans to follow as it considers rule changes for security at the nation's 63 nuclear power stations. 

The memo, from Luis A. Reyes, executive director for operations, anticipates that recommendations that could mandate guards at plant entrances will be presented to the commissioners next February. 

If the NRC adheres to the schedule, the recommendation would come nearly five years after TMIA petitioned the agency for the change.

A statement issued by the watchdog group yesterday called the NRC's failure to act on its request irresponsible and unreasonable. "For nearly four and a half years the NRC has misled [TMIA] about its deliberations on the petition," the statement said. "When requesting status updates, the NRC perpetually stated that a decision on the petition would be made within three to six months." 

TMIA asked the NRC to require plant operators to keep at least one armed guard at each plant entrance. The petition, which was drafted weeks before the terror attacks of 9/11, argued that the guards would serve as a physical and visual deterrent against attacks.  

Since 9/11, the NRC has issued security requirements aimed at making the plants less vulnerable to attack. Changes include the addition of guard towers, truck barriers, deeper background checks and high-tech fencing. Most, if not all, plant owners post guards at their front gates. 

 For months after the terror attacks, Pennsylvania was among several states to assigned National Guard troops to the plants. NRC officials have denied allegations of foot dragging. Petitions such as TMIA's, which require rule changes, take a long time to complete, officials said. 

The Nuclear Energy Institute, which represents plant owners and operators, opposes the petition.  It told the NRC that guards should be posted only when the level of security threat makes it prudent. 

On July 29, 2005, the NRC a issued White Violation relating to another staffing deficiency at Three Mile Island where “approximately 50% of the emergency responders,” including “key responders”  were “overdue” for their annual training for “an approximate five month period. (Please refer to Thursday, July 14, 2005, for background material).

-Report by Garry Lenton of the Patriot-News

 

 

March 30, 2005

NRC reviews Peach Bottom, plant a leader in shutdowns

 

Attendees seemed more in the dark last night after a 90-minute session aimed at shedding light on Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station's performance last year.

Exelon and Nuclear Regulatory Commission officials didn't exactly wow the crowd of about 40 with a slide show highlighting corporate progress, touting a 25 percent reduction in radioactive exposure to employees and diagramming federal "matrixes" and "cornerstone" safety guidelines.

One attendee asked why the commission couldn't just grade performances A to F, drop bureaucraticese and spell out problems that affect the public.

The bottom line: The NRC found that Peach Bottom improved in 2004 with two shutdowns of its Unit 2 reactor compared to three in 2003.

The shut downs placed Peach Bottom in the top three nationwide for unexpected shutdowns right behind Indian Point 2 in New York and Saint Lucie Unit 2 in Florida.

Five shutdowns in Unit 2 over two years is a lot when compared to the national average of less than one shutdown annually at the country's 103 commercial plants, said Eric Epstein of Three Mile Island Alert, a Harrisburg-based nonprofit citizens' organization.

The NRC said the shutdowns, called "scrams," were low-level safety risks but noteworthy nonetheless.

Want better procedures: Federal officials also warned the plant, operated by Exelon Corp., that its procedure in finding and reporting causes for shutdowns needs improvement. "They said our focus regarding inspections was too narrow," said Robert Braun, Exelon's site vice president at Peach Bottom. "We'll apply what they told us, which was to broaden our investigation."

Braun said that the shutdowns pose no threat to the public but only affect the company's bottom line. He further touted adherence to safety guidelines saying the plant was taking a "proactive approach." That tack, he said, would help plant workers discover problems such as the cause of a Unit 2 shutdown in July 2003.

A piece of broken fan belt that had been lost "a number of years ago" entered a cooling system and caused the shutdown. The debris wasn't found when the belt broke, but "years later it came back to haunt the plant," Braun said. "We continue to improve our existing processes," he added.

Epstein questions numbers: Epstein asked corporate and federal officials how many workers were employed at Peach Bottom, whether they had decreased in the past five years and if so, would that affect plant performance and the reduction in radiation exposure. NRC Chief of Projects Branch 4 Mohamed Shanbaky said the plant was in federal compliance with the number of employees needed for high-profile jobs such as reactor operators.

Shanbaky further said the NRC doesn't focus on the overall number of employees but rather whether federal rules are obeyed and safety regulations adhered to.

"This meeting was the NRC's assessment for 2004," said April Schlipp, Exelon spokeswoman, who added that there have been no staffing changes since the 2003 assessment. "We've been able to improve for the past two years; that's really the most relevant here."

Beth Birchall, a Lancaster County resident, sat in the back of the Peach Bottom Inn banquet room shaking her head.

"They seemed prepared," she said. "But there wasn't a lot of information."

The NRC has scheduled quarterly, team and regional inspections of the plant in 2005.

-Report by Kathy Stevens of the York Dispatch

 

May 27, 2005 

Many emergency sirens would not work if power lines were down

 

In the event of a nuclear accident or an act of terrorism at a U.S. nuclear power station simultaneously occurring with an electrical grid failure, only 27 percent  of the nation’s 62 nuclear power emergency planning zones using public notification siren systems are prepared to fully operate their emergency sirens independent of the main power lines,”  emergency enforcement petition filed by Nuclear Information & Resource Service, Three Mile Island Alert and numerous citizens’ groups. 

While the Nuclear Regulatory Commission revealed that some but not all of the sites without backup power are preparing to create battery backups, the NRC actually denied the petition, and argued that the concerned citizens should instead use a petition for rulemaking process that can take as long as two years. 

Peach Bottom is  grid-dependent for sirens. 

    

 

July  2005

Peach Bottom Investigation: NRC probes shutdown at Peach Bottom

 

Officials with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission will follow up 

on the cause of a turbine trip that led to the automatic  shutdown of Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station's Unit 2 reactor on July 10, 2004.

At the time of the shutdown, the unit's reactor coolant system experienced a high pressure condition that caused both recirculation pumps to trip. As a result, three safety-relief valves lifted and reseated.

By Tuesday morning, the reactor had returned to 67 percent power.

In September 2004, the NRC staff, through an additional inspection, investigated the reasons behind Unit 2's four unplanned shutdowns per 7,000 critical hours, or roughly one year of operation. The unscheduled shutdowns occurred between the fourth quarter of 2002 and the fourth quarter of 2003.

 On December 22, 2004, Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station's Unit 2 reactor had another emergency shutdown and was off-line for 48 hours.

 

Circuit Breaker Replacement Primary Bushings Not Tested

to American National Standards Institute (ANSI) Standards

 

While investigating the dedication process of a different circuit breaker

component, GE Energy-Nuclear (GE) discovered that ANSI testing had not been

accomplished for the AM breaker primary bushings used in Magne-Blast circuit

breakers. The replacement primary bushings were provided by GE Supply PSC,

Sharon Hills, Pa., and supplied to Watts Bar and Peach Bottom, units 2 and 3,

by GE as safety-related components. The NRC issued a report to inform all licensees of this issue since additional licensees may have obtained these devices through other dedicating entities.

Previously, the GE product department produced Magne-Blast circuit breakers

and switchgear, that was qualified to the appropriate ANSI C37 standards.

When the GE breaker plant operation facility was closed, GE contracted with

a vendor to manufacture primary bushings. The contractor uses a similar but

not identical insulating material, and has variations in the manufacturing

process for the bushing construction. GE dedication specifications addressed

the replacement insulation material, but not the variation in the

manufacturing process. An implicit assumption in the GE dedication

specification was that testing in compliance with the applicable ANSI

standard had been completed.

GE has determined that design tests in accordance with certain ANSI C37

Industry Standards for Switchgear were not performed prior to implementation

of bushing design changes for Parts Q0845D0123G001, and Q0845D0124G001 andG003, which have been delivered to Peach Bottom 2, 3 and Watts Bar 1 for use as replacement primary bushings in Magne-Blast circuit breakers.

 For primary bushings purchased under the identified purchase orders and

placed in inventory, GE recommended that the primary bushings in inventory

not be installed until after successful completion of the ANSI standards testing. 

For primary bushings purchased under the identified purchase orders and

installed in Magne-Blast circuit breakers, GE recommended that no corrective

or preventive action be taken, pending completion of the ANSI standards testing.

- From reports by York Daily Record and NRC documents

 

July 21, 2005 

Inspection finds only 'Green' problems 

 

An inspection of the Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station resulted in two findings of "very low safety significance" that were categorized as Green by the NRC. Neither finding was cited, according to the report. 

A report on the inspection by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission stated that Peach Bottom staff identified "inadequate procurement of quality services for the commercial grade dedication of the Unit 3 high pressure coolant injection(HPCI) electronic flow controller." The report explained the internal power supply was not properly identified for replacement to "preclude any age-related degradation" and failed while installed in the Unit 3 HPCI. 

The report said this failure affects the ability to ensure "the availability, reliability and capability of system that respond to an initiating event to prevent undesirable circumstances." A single train system was unavailable for less than three days because of this loss of safety function, the report said. 

Another finding showed that procedure instructions prepared but not in a timely manner, upon discovery of an inoperable  component and leakage of a component boundary for Unit 2. The leak was repaired and Unit 2 returned to service, the report said, explaining why, though the finding was considered "greater than minor" that there was no citation. 

-Report by Marlene Lang 

 

 

Aug. 30, 2005 

Peach Bottom's mid-cycle performance review receives a 'White' rating for three shutdowns in 12 quarters

 

The Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Unit 2 had what the NRC terms "three scrams" with a "loss of normal heat removal" all within 12 calendar quarters, the plant earned itself an unusual White Performance Indicator (PI). 

A SCRAM is an industry acronym representing a nuclear reactor shutdown (Skived Coke Rod Adversive Motion).

All of the other findings by inspectors were classified as Green, and considered of "very low safety significance." 

-Report by Marlene Lang

 

Sept. 12, 2005 

NRC inspectors: No findings of significance at Peach Bottom 

 

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission released a report on its most recent inspcection of the Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, saying no findings of significance were identified, but adding that minor problems were found. 

The report went on to explain that "causal evaluations for equipment issues and events reasonably identified the causes of the problem and developed appropriately corrective actions." The report added, "However, for some of the issues affecting human performance, the evaluations were not of sufficient depth to identify the base root cause; therefore, the corrective actions did not prevent further human performance errors of a similar nature." 

In two cases, read the report, "operability determinations did not consider all the applicable information to support the final conclusion that the equipment was operable." 

Corrective actions were typically implemented in a timely manner, the inspectors said, but added that they found in one case, "corrective actions were not adequate to correct the problem, and did not prevent reoccurrence."

-Report by Marlene Lang 

 

Sept. 13, 2005 

Peach Bottom 2 nuke exits outage

 

 Exelon Corp.'s  1,112-megawatt Unit 2 reactor at the Peach Bottom 

nuclear power station in Pennsylvania exited an outage and ramped 

up to 43 percent of capacity by early Tuesday, the U.S. Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission said in a report.

- Report by Reuters

 

Sept. 19, 2005 

In a failure to follow procedures, plant operators entered the Unit 3 reactor's drywell after a reactor shutdown but did not, before entering, collect and analyze a radiation sample for airborne particulate and iodine, as required by code. 

The failure could have resulted in worker radiation exposure at unsafe dose levels, said a Nuclear Regulatory Commission report made in January, 2006. 

Because the two individuals who entered did not sustain any significant dose, no citation was made and the finding was labeled Green. 

 

Sept. 30, 2005 

Fire barrier systems inadequate in real fires, says NIRS 

 

At a public meeting, Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff "announced their recommendation to the Commission to drop a proposed rule making that would substitute controversial "manual actions" for federally required nuclear power station fire protection requirements on electrical cablling (physical fires, minimal cable separation with automated detection and suppression) vital to shutting down the reactor in the event of a significant fire," according to an industry newsletter. 

According to Nuclear Information & Resource Service (NIRS), "Since 1992, NIRS has identified widespread nuclear industry violations where fire barrier systems, .... have dramatically failed standardized industry fire tests and would likely fail to protect reactor safety systems in the event of a real fire." 

The NRC subsequently declared the fire barriers "inoperable" for protecting electrical power circuits, control and instrumentation cables used in the event of fire to remotely operate reactor shutdown. 

As a result, the NIRS explained in the Oct. 14, 2005 issue of Nuclear Monitor, "the majority of the U.S. nuclear power industry was found to be in violation of safety standards as prescribed under current Code of Federal Regulation." 

The report went on to say that "the federal agency (NRC) failed to take effective enforcement action and require that operators become compliant with the current fire protection law by installing qualified fire barriers or maintaining minimal separation requirements between electrical circuits for reactor safety-related equipment. 

 

Oct. 31, 2005 

NRC announces inspection 

 

The NRC informed Exelon Nuclear that  it would perform a triennial fire protection baseline inspection in January and February of 2006. A letter stated the NRC would make an information gathering visit the week of Jan. 9 and would perform the onsite inspection the weeks of Jan. 23-28 and Feb. 6-10. 

 

Nov. 1, 2005

Inspectors find three federal code violations, issue no citations

 

An airborne radiation sampler was not sampling correctly, NRC inspectors discovered during an integrated inspection of the Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station. 

The inspection, which was completed Sept. 30, turned up three issues, none of which resulted in a citation. 

The radioiodine and particulate sampler is required to be in one of the highest annual average ground level D/Q areas. The report also said that Exelon had failed to conduct vegetation or milk sampling of highest calculated annal average ground level D/Q at the nearest offsite garden. The report did not explain what "D/Q" was an abbreviation for. 

The report said the failure could affect "protection of public health and safety from exposure to radioactive materials released into the public domain." However, the finding was considered of "very low safety significance" because "calculations of public dose commitments did not identify andy significant public dose or environmental impacts." 

NRC inspectors also found that emergency workers required to use respiratory equipment had not maintained their qualifications. The violation affects readiness, the report stated, which in turn could put public health and safety at risk in a radiological emergency. The matter was deemed of "very low safety significance." Owner Exelon was not cited. 

Exelon was not cited, either, after its Peach Bottom staff failed to "implement established procedures adherence standards during recovery from an aborted routine test." Operators did not perform the appropriate portions of the restoration section, did not initiate a temporary procedure change, and did not seek technical support after receiving an unexpected test result, according to the report. The error contributed to a reactor trip, but did not result in a citation because the error did not increase the likelihood of equipment or functions being unavailable, the NRC report stated. 

-Report by Marlene Lang

 

 

Jan. 22, 2006

Fire watch technician pleads guilty to falsifying records

        A contracted employee at the Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station 

pleaded guilty Jan. 9 to the falsification of records used to safely 

operate the dual-reactor nuclear power plant.

Between Jan. 17, 2005, and March 20, 2005, Tracy David,

formerly of Bartlett Service Inc., failed to conduct hourly fire

watch inspections in multiple sections of the plant including

the emergency diesel generator room and the cable spreading room.

Contacted by telephone, David - a resident of Quarryville, Pa.,

according to court documents - declined to be interviewed for

this story.

Based in Plymouth, Mass., Bartlett Services is a subcontractor

for the Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station.

On 199 occasions, David claimed that she had completed her

rounds of fire watch inspections while on duty at the plant,

said Neil Sheehan, spokesman for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission.

Last year, both the NRC and plant officials ran independent

investigations that uncovered evidence that showed that David

had falsified her fire watch inspections and had not completed

her rounds.

When interviewed by representatives of the NRC's Office of

Investigations, David commented that one reason for her accused

offense was that she had been disgruntled after being passed

over for a promotion, Sheehan said.

"There were a significant number of fire watches that were

missed," he said. "But (the plant) still had fire suppression

systems in place."

Regardless of the seriousness of the charges, the commission

found that the safety significance was low since no fires were

reported and each room on David's route was equipped with

automatic fire-detection systems, Sheehan said.

A fire watch technician walks a predetermined route, checking

sections of the plant for smoke or other signs of fire, said

Paul Gunter, director of the reactor watchdog project for the

Nuclear Information and Resource Service. The technician keeps=

records of hourly checks to ensure that each room has been

monitored at a particular time.

"The job is pretty monotonous," said April Schilpp, a

spokeswoman for the plant.

Gunter said his organization has tracked fire protection

violations at nuclear power plants since the early 1990s.

For many years, Gunter's group has argued for improved fire

barriers and other systems rather than rely on fire watches.

"(Plants) should put in adequate fire protection features," he

said. "You put humans into the picture, there will be an error.

Especially with roving fire watches."

The manual fire watch checks serve as a compensatory measure

as ordered by the NRC. The commission requires that fire watches

be conducted for any room inside a plant that has its fire

detectors on automatic but its fire suppression system on manual.

At times, a plant may switch its fire suppression equipment to

manual if the system proves too sensitive, Sheehan said.

Should a fire watch patrol worker spot signs of smoke, the

worker would immediately notify the on-site firefighting

brigade, he said.

"It is a very important function," Sheehan said.

Along her route, David's duty's took her to the plant's cable

spreading room and to the emergency diesel generator room - the

site of a small June 2003 fire.

Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station is equipped with four

emergency diesel generators that kick on when the plant loses

power.

The generators serve as a source of backup energy. They power

the plant's vital equipment including systems used to safely

shut down the power station, Sheehan said.

In June 2003, NRC inspectors found that plant technicians had

not adequately tightened the engine top cover flange joint bolts

of an emergency diesel generator during a maintenance procedure.

As a result, lube oil leaked from the joint and caused a small

fire on the exhaust manifold during a test.

While no fires occurred during David's shifts, an internal

investigation carried out by Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station

officials did raise eyebrows concerning David's actions while on

the job.

In February, while on duty, David's personal dosimeter sounded

when it should not have gone off, Schilpp said. Typically worn

around the neck, a dosimeter is a pager-sized piece of equipment

that measures and detects radiation.

As part of the plant procedure, when a worker's dosimeter

sounds, that person must leave the room and locate a plant

technician, Schilpp said.

A quick check found that David had come from an area of the

plant that was not part of her route, Schilpp said.

"She was not supposed to anywhere near that area," Schilpp

said. "At that point, (the plant) started to question other

things."

As part of the investigation, plant officials checked previous

dosimeter readings and found that, in some cases, David's scans

did not match what they should have been for her predetermined

route.

Plant investigators tracked David by her badge, which is

needed as a key to enter specific areas of the site.

"The evidence was overwhelming that things were not going

right," Schilpp said. "We saw a pattern emerge."

At the onset of its own investigation, the plant alerted the

NRC to the situation, she said.

"We self-identified the problem," Schilpp said. "We want

people to be doing the things we ask them to do and to fulfill

the obligations of our license."

Site officials confronted David with their evidence and

conducted an interview to make sure the plant had not been

deficient in explaining to the contracted employee what her job

had entailed.

"She told us that she fully understood the job," Schilpp said,

adding, "We don't want this to happen again."

Peach Bottom notified Bartlett Services that David had not

been doing her job as assigned and had falsified fire watch

records.

Bartlett Services removed David from her fire watch position

at Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station in late March. On April 15,

the NRC opened its own investigation.

Since the commission is not a legal or judicial agency, the

NRC notified the U.S. Department of Justice of its

investigation. The Department of Justice, in turn, accepted the

case for potential action.

"If we have findings of a criminal or deliberate nature,"

Sheehan said, "we refer those to the (U.S. Department of

Justice)."

At the guilty plea proceedings held earlier this month, David

acknowledged that she had falsified her fire watch records, said

Martin Carlson, the assistant U.S. attorney assigned to the case.

A sentencing date for David has not yet been set.

-Report by Sean Adkins of the York Daily Record/Sunday News

 

 

Jan. 22, 2006 

TMI guards sue over wages

 

Dozens of guards at the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant claim in a federal lawsuit that a private security agency made them work unpaid overtime for more than two years.

The lawsuit alleges that Wackenhut Corp. wasn't paying the 79 guards for the time it took them to get armed and check through security from January 2002 until April 2004.

The guards' lawyer, Leslie Deak, said the time in question was typically 10 or 15 minutes before work and a few minutes at the end of their shifts, and that the workers are entitled to hundreds of thousands of dollars in back pay.

The company has declined to compensate them for the allegedly lost wages, but began paying the guards for that time after they staged a work action, she said.

The guards are armed but do not take their weapons home, and they require some time at the start and end of their shifts to deal with the guns and other equipment, she said. The company had not been paying them for that time until the work action took place.

Ralph DeSantis, a spokesman for Three Mile Island's owner, AmerGen Energy Co., had no comment on the lawsuit but said Wackenhut has provided security there for about the past five years.

"We have a contract with Wackenhut, but they are the ones that pay the officers and determine the work rules with those officers," DeSantis said. AmerGen Energy is headquartered in Warrenville, Ill.

Three Mile Island, located in Middletown, about 10 miles southeast of Harrisburg, was the site of the nation's worst nuclear accident when a partial meltdown occurred in March 1979. Security there has tightened considerably since Sept. 11, 2001.

-Report by Mark Scolforo, Associated Press

 

Jan. 25, 2006

 

An integrated inspection of Exelon Nuclear's Peach Bottom Atomic Power Plant documented two violations, neither of which resulted in citation of Exelon by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

In a failure to follow procedures, plant operators on Sept. 19, 2005, entered the Unit 3 reactor's drywell after a reactor shutdown but did not, before entering, collect and analyze a radiation sample for airborne particulate and iodine, as required by code. 

The failure could have resulted in worker radiation exposure at unsafe dose levels, the report said. 

Because the two individuals who entered did not sustain any significant dose, no citation was made and the finding was labeled Green. 

Nor was a citation made when NRC inspectors discovered that following a valve replacement, high pressure service water (HPWS) was not adequately tested. The report stated that "The post-maintenance test did not account for the known degraded condition of the 3B residual heat removal heat exchanger HPSW outlet throttle valve. Improper test control on two occasions did not identify that high pressure service water flow through the section was below the established "design basis" flow. 

The finding was categorized as Green, the report explained, because it did not result in a loss of function.

-Report by Marlene Lang 

 

Feb. 10, 2006 

Fire inspection finds nothing significant 

 

A fire protection inspection of the Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station resulted in "no significant findings" by federal inspectors. 

A report on the inspection, from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, dated March 9, 2006, stated that the purpose of the triennial fire protection inspection was to assess whether Peach Bottom owner Exelon had implemented and adequate fire protection program and that "post-fire safe shutdown capabilities have been established and are being properly maintained." 

-Report by Marlene Lang

 

Feb. 19, 2006

Peach Bottom reactor operating after shut down

 

The operators of Three Mile Island, Peach Bottom and Limerick nuclear power plants are checking their systems for leaks of water laced with tritium, a radioactive isotope linked to cancer. 

Chicago-based Exelon Energy Co., which owns the plants, ordered the inspections after water contaminated with tritium was found in the groundwater or in test wells at three of its plants in Illinois. Exelon owns 10 nuclear plants. 

The company ordered each plant to conduct inspections of systems that carry tritium-laced water. The inspections will include pipes, pumps, valves, tanks and other equipment, said Ralph DeSantis, a spokesman for AmerGen Energy, the operator of TMI and a subsidiary of Exelon. 

Tritium, a radioactive isotope of hydrogen, is a byproduct of the nuclear reaction. In large doses, it has been linked to cancer. 

"Our purpose is to ensure that we have a full understanding of the health of our systems that handle tritium and that we have satisfied ourselves ... that our equipment has a high degree of integrity," said Charles Pardee, Exelon's nuclear chief operating officer. 

TMI officials have been monitoring tritium since shortly after the 1979 accident that destroyed the Unit 2 reactor. About a dozen monitoring wells are checked at TMI quarterly, DeSantis said. 

Higher-than-usual tritium levels were found in a test well at TMI last fall, said David Allard, the director of the state Department of Environmental Protection's Radiation Control Program. The amounts never exceeded 19,000 picocuries per liter of water. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency allows up to 20,000 picocuries per liter in drinking water. There is no standard for groundwater. 

The leak was traced to a sump pump and corrected, Allard said. 

Tritium-laced water is routinely released into the Susquehanna River by TMI, where it is diluted. 

The DEP monitors the river at Steelton and Columbia. "I'd be very surprised if we ever saw any tritium," Allard said. 

Eric Epstein, the chairman of the watchdog group Three Mile Island Alert, called on Exelon to be more aggressive with its well testing. 

The EPA describes tritium as one of the least dangerous radioactive substances because it emits weak radiation and usually leaves the body within a month.

-Report by Garry Lenton of the Patriot-News 

 

Feb. 27, 2006 

Fire cause power reduction, 'no threat'

 

A electrical fired occurred at Peach Bottom's Unit 3 transformer, forcing the plant to reduce power to 50 percent. 

Exelon and government officials said the fire posed no threat to the public, as it happened in a non-nuclear area of the plant, shortly after 9 a.m. It was extinguished by 10:32 a.m., officials said. 

The fire was traced to a transformer cabinet in the turbine building of the Unit 3 reactor, said April Schlipp, spokeswoman for the plant's owner, Exelon Nuclear. 

-Report by Garry Lenton

 

Feb. 28, 2006 

NRC examing TMI security 

 

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission plans to investigate the management of the security force at Three Mile Island, focusing on fitness-for-duty issues such as fatigue and sleeping on the job. 

The probe, announced in a certified letter delivered to a Patriot-News reporter, was prompted by a story published Jan. 29. 

The story reported on a memo in which John Young, head of the Wackenhut security, scolded security supervisors for failing to note that veteran officers were telling new hires safe places to sleep undetected while on duty. Wackenhut is a private security firm hired by plant owner Exelon Nuclear to guard the nuclear station. 

The memo also said officers were telling new hires ways to short-cut patrol duties. 

Of additional concern to the NRC were reports that security officers were being allowed to work excessive hours. The newspaper documented one person who worked more than 150 hours during a 14-day period, and averaged more than 54 hours a week for more than 10 months. 

Since March 2004, AmerGen Energy, the operator of TMI, investigated and disciplined five workers for "inattentiveness to duty." The phrase is used by the industry and regulators to cover an array of conditions, including sleeping. Three of those workers were security officers. 

Guards, speaking on the condition of anonymity, said fatigue from long hours and boredom were to blame for the inattentiveness. 

Guards work 12-hour shifts at TMI. Federal regulations limit those hours to 16 out of 24; 26 hours out of 48; and 72 out of seven days. 

The agency said it will not announce the findings of the probe. 

"Due to the nature of the security-related issues ... we are not providing you with further information on this matter," wrote David J. Vito, senior allegation coordinator for the NRC. 

-Report by Garry Lenton of the Patriot-News

 

 

 

March 1, 2006

Drop-in inspections planned by state 

 

Prompted by reports of sleeping or inattentive employees at Three Mile Island, the state said it will conduct surprise inspections at least twice a month at Pennsylvania's five nuclear power plants. 

The first round of inspections last month found no instances of inattentiveness on the part of control roomoperators or plant security, Gov. Ed Rendell said yesterday. 

 

The state Department of Environmental Protection will continue the inspections through the end of the year. Then the DEP will decide whether to continue the practice, said Ronald Ruman, a department spokesman. 

The inspections came shortly after The Patriot-News reported on five cases of inattentiveness at TMI that occurred since March 2004. 

Report by Garry Lenton of the Patriot-News 

 

March 2, 2006

NRC notes three shutdowns of Unit 2 

 

Peach Bottom's annual assessment of it nuclear reactors noted that the Atomic Power Station's Unit 2 reactor was shut down three times in 12 quarters, "with a loss of normal heat removal," a rate which resulted in a "White" level performance indicator. White is the second least significant, just above Green. 

-Report by Marlene Lang

 

March 15, 2006 

NRC responds: Incidents unrelated 

 

The NRC's Senior Allegation Coordinator responded to TMIA's Eric Epstein, in a letter, saying that two incidents of workers falsifying records at the Peach Bottom plant were unrelated and did not represent a pervasive problem. 

One incident involved a fire-watch report in January 2006. Another, in October 2001, involved falsification of maintenance tests on sirens. 

-Report by Marlene Lang

 

May 3, 2006 

 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission inspectors found Peach Bottom was not adequately testing it E-2 emergency diesel generator (EDG) air coolant auxiliary pump following shaft packing replacement, according to a report on an inspection completed March 31, 2006.

A post-maintenance test did not account for the higher pressure that occurs in the EDG cooling subsystem when the EDG is operating and the cooling system is pressurized by the attached cooling pump, the NRC report explained. Ten gallons of water leaked on the  floor in the area of the EDG, as a result, and the leak occurred over a 22-hour period on Dec. 27 and 28, 2005. 

The report further stated that personnel had "an inadequate understanding of the air coolant auxiliary pump design and the pump's interrelation with the EDG operation," though the information was available to the testers. 

The finding was label Green and owner Exelon was not cited, though a plan was made to correct the problem, the report said. 

Inspectors also reviewed an event that happen on Jan. 1, 2006, in which a Unit 2 reactor control rod drive (CRD) system flow transmitter failed by "drifting low." This resulted in an increased control rod drive flow as the flow control valve open in an attempt to compensate for the low flow in the CRD system and according to the report, the condition was not immediately identified. Core thermal power increased and operators reduced power while the situation was evaluated. It turned out that the system was not at in overpower condition. 

Also noted in the report, on Feb 13, 2006, operators forgot to complete required technical specification tests after a slow start of an emergency diesel generator. They remember three hours later to do the tests, the report stated. 

None of the incidents resulted in citations, as they were considered of low safety significance. 

-Report by Marlene Lang 

 

May 12, 2006 

The NRC evaluated Emergency Preparedness exercises held April 25 at Peach Bottom's Unit 2 and Unit 3, reporting no findings of significance. 

 

May 17, 2006

After employee falsified records, plant stays in compliance, with firing

 

The federal Nuclear Regulatory Commission gave its lowest form of

enforcement notice to the nuclear power plant in Peach Bottom Township

after an investigation into falsified plant records.

Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station sidestepped a more severe infraction

from the regulatory agency by identifying and immediately acting on

the violation by a contracted employee, the federal commission said in

a letter dated May 12.

As part of a backup verification to its fire safety system, Exelon Corp. contracts with Bartlett Service of Massachusetts to enter certain rooms and verify there is no fire or risk of a fire.

Between January and March of 2005, Exelon determined an employee of

Bartlett – whom the commission did not name – falsified records on

the fire watch logs on almost 200 occasions.

When Exelon realized what had happened, the employee was fired, and

the company started its own investigation, along with notifying the

proper authorities of the violation.

In the letter to Exelon, the commission said it considered a more

severe infraction, but settled on a "non-cited violation." As a

result, the power plant must take corrective action to improve the

fire watch performance and prevent the violation from happening again

– which the commission noted Exelon had already done a year prior.

"You restored compliance immediately after identification of the violation by terminating the employee," the commission said in the letter, "and by conducting a prompt investigation to review the access records for other contractor fire watch staff that concluded that the individual's action was an isolated case."

The violation was classified at Severity Level IV, the lowest severity

level. In comparison, commission spokeswoman Diane Screnci said a

Severity Level III violation would have included the consideration of

a fine.

Exelon agreed with the level of severity set by the commission, said

April Schilpp, a spokeswoman for the Peach Bottom power plant.

-Report by Charles Schillinger of the York Dispatch

 

June 1, 2006

Inspection turns up one test issue

 

An NRC inspection completed on April 21, 2006 turned up one low-significance finding, according to a report released June 1. 

Inspectors reported that Peach Bottom operators failed to ensure that test procedures for the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) and the reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) pump had acceptance criteria incorporating limits from design documents. Failing to stay within the limits for which the pump was designed could degrade the pump to a lower limit could interfere with proper flow and discharge pressure. The finding was not cited and a correction plan was made, the report stated. 

-Report by Marlene Lang 

 

June 30, 2006 

The NRC completed an integrated inspection of the Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station with four findings, all rated "Green," and all not cited. 

One finding by inspectors involved barrier integrity, according to a report on the inspection, dated July 26, 2006. 

Exelon was to compare task performance between its plants at Limerick and Peach Bottom, according to company procedures established in 1991, the report stated. Inspectors found that three out of five job performance measures for Limerick Senior Reactor Operators who handled fuel differed significantly in the way they were performed. The NRC report said the differences should have been explored, but were not, and that the failure could have affected physical design barriers that protects the public from radionuclide releases. The finding was not cited. 

In another Green finding, personnel failed to properly implement procedures for a high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) turbine exhaust drain piping. 

This failure, the report explained, preventd an HPCI containment isolation valve closure on April 5, 2006. The matter was considered of very low safety significance because it did not represent an actual open pathway in the physical integrity of the barrier. 

There was also a finding that affected emergency preparedness. Inspectors found a ready-for-use self-contained emergency apparatus in the main control room which had a partially separated regulator air diffuser. The finding was categorized as Green. 

In a violation of NRC requirements that one residual heat removal (RHR) shutdown cooling system (for high water level) be operable and in operation during a shutdown, and this was not the case in instances in September 2002 and 2003. No citation was made as there were no actual safety consequences caused by the failure. 

-Report by Marlene Lang

 

July 24, 2006 

NRC responds to fire watch concerns: There is no chronic problem 

 

A Nuclear Regulatory Commission official responded to Eric Epstein's June 12, 2006 letter, in which Epstein ask whether the NRC believed there were a chronic problem at Peach Bottom regarding missed fire watches. 

The NRC stated they did a historic review of missed fire watches at the plant and that no chronic problem was found. 

Epstein was also told that there was no adverse issue with documentation falsification, after an inquiry. 

Epstein asked about a matrix being used to reach these conclusions and the NRC stated it did not use a "matrix" but instead made inspections and reviews. 

-Report by Marlene Lang 

 

Aug. 16, 2006

'Unusual Event' Declared, Terminated at Peach Bottom Plant in York County

 

Exelon Nuclear’s Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station’s fire brigade extinguished a small fire onsite yesterday after a backup emergency diesel generator’s exhaust gasket on the roof of the diesel generator building unexpectedly caught fire.  

The fire occurred during routine testing of one of the station’s four diesel generators. The fire prompted the declaration of an Unusual Event at 6:14 p.m. Tuesday, in accordance with station procedures, due to a fire in the Protected Area that was not extinguished within 15 minutes. The fire was extinguished at 6:35, and the Event was terminated at 8:40 p.m. No offsite fire responders were needed to extinguish the fire.

There was no threat to the safe operation of the plant, and there was no danger to station personnel. 

An Unusual Event is the lowest of four emergency classifications established by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. There was no danger to the public during the event and no special action by the public was needed. 

Exelon Nuclear notified all appropriate federal, state and local emergency response officials of the Unusual Event.

 

 

Oct. 11, 2006 

Reactor back in service

 

A nuclear power plant reactor in southern York County returned to service yesterday morning after a cracked pipe in the cooling system forced owner Exelon Nuclear to shut the reactor down Saturday night. 

The shutdown was the second at the Peach Bottom Nuclear Station in 15 months and the third since 2003. 

The reactor, which had been off line for three weeks for refueling and maintenance, was only two hours into its restart when an equipment operator noticed a leak in a pipe used to test the cooling system, said April Schilpp, spokeswoman for the plant. 

-Report by Garry Lenton of the Patriot-News

 

 

Oct. 20, 2006 

Peach Bottom among nuclear power plants included in study

 

The Peach Bottom nuclear power plant in Pennsylvania and Seabrook Station in New Hampshire has been chosen as one of six nuclear power plants nationwide to be part of a study of the consequences of an accident that would release radioactivity into the atmosphere. 

The other nuclear plants being reviewed are Diablo Canyon in California; Duane Arnold in Iowa; Fermi in Michigan; and Salem in New Jersey. The study is expected to take three years. 

"The sites were picked based on the demographics of the surrounding communities and the type of containment used," said Scott Brunnell of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

The study will bring together information about how accidents could occur within containment buildings; how containment could be breached; how radioactive plumes could travel; and how effective emergency planning would be, Brunnell said. 

Ultimately, the criteria developed as a result of this study would be applied to all U.S. nuclear power plants, Brunnell said. 

Seabrook Station spokesman Alan Griffith said that all nuclear plants would eventually be reviewed. He said this is an effort on the part of the NRC to update its methodology. 

"It will be beneficial to the community because the NRC will be taking a look at emergency planning," Griffith said. "Ultimately, it will be good for all of us." 

-Report by the Portsmouth Herald

 

Feb. 5. 2007

Operators compensate for low system settings

 

An integrated inspection by the NRC found Peach Bottom workers failed to follow procedure for equipment evaluations involving pressure pulsations going into standby liquid control (SLC) systems in which relief valves were degraded. 

According to a report, on Nov. 21, 2006, engineering personnel documented the incorrect setting of SLC pump relief valves. During the rebuild of Peach Bottom's Unit 3 on Nov. 1, 2004, an SLC pump discharge relief valve was incorrectly adjusted from its design setpoint. There were similar setting questions about Unit 2 and engineers determined that Units 2 and 3 SLC systems were degraded and set low, but still operable, with  "two compensatory actions" to maintain pressure. The report noted the relief valves were scheduled to be replaced during each unit's next refueling outage. 

The finding was considered of very low safety significance and was not cited. 

-Report by Marlene Lang 

 

 

Feb. 28, 2007

Power plant fire not a threat, officials say

 

An electrical fire at the Peach Bottom nuclear station in southern York County yesterday posed no threat to the plant's operating nuclear reactors, according to company and government officials.

The fire, discovered shortly after 9 a.m. in a non-nuclear area, was extinguished by 10:32 a.m. and there were no injuries, officials said.

The fire was traced to a transformer cabinet in the turbine building of the Unit 3 reactor, said April Schilpp, spokeswoman for the plant's owner, Exelon Nuclear. As a precaution, officials shut down the turbine and cut power to 50 percent.

Company officials were assessing the damages, but they were expected to be minor.

"It should not prevent the plant from operating normally," Schilpp said.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission spokeswoman Diane Screnci said the plant was stable and that its inspectors were in the plant control room monitoring the situation.

The fire is the ninth at Peach Bottom since 1986, and the second in the Unit-3 turbine buildings, according to a chronology put together by the watchdog group Three Mile Island Alert using NRC documents.

The most recent was a small fire in an emergency backup diesel generator in August, 2004.

"Fires at nuclear power plants are never a welcome development," said TMIA Chairman Eric Epstein. "Older plants with aging parts, like Peach Bottom, require heightened vigilance. The root cause needs to be identified and defeated."

-Report by Garry Lenton of the Patriot-News

 

March 17, 2007

Fire was electrical 

 

The Pennsylvania Department of Natural Resources reported that it was a breaker that caught on fire at the Peach Bottom plant in February. A spokesman said the fire was electrical in nature.  

"They replaced the breaker and verified proper connections and amperages to prevent a recurrence. I have not yet seen the utility's root cause evaluation, but Dennis Dyckman of my staff is following up on this with the plant," according to Rich Janati, of the DEP.

 

March 20, 2007 

A former security manager for Wackenhut Coporation reportedly sent a letter to the Project on Government Oversight, who passed it on the the Office of the Inspector General on March 27. The writer of the letter claimed that Peach Bottom security officers were fatigued from working excessive overtime or 12-hour shifts and would cover for each other so they could take naps of 10 minutes or more during shifts. According to an NRC memo released Aug. 22, 2008, the letter also indicate the past efforts by the NRC to identify personnel sleeping on duty had failed, and alleged that NRC and Exelon were aware that officers were sleeping while on duty, and said security officers feared retaliation for raising safety concerns. 

The memo stated the letter was provided to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission resident inspector at Peach Bottom in March 2007, and that at that time the concerns it relayed were evaluated under the NRC allegation program by the NRC's Region I office, which oversees Peach Bottom. 

In August 2007, Region I concluded the concerns were not substantiated and the allegation filed was closed, according to an NRC document. 

-Report by Marlene Lang 

 

 

2007

Baltimore Examiner summary of Peach Bottom sleeping guards incidents 

 

March: John Jasinski sends the Nuclear Regulatory Commission a letter alleging guards are sleeping throughout the nuclear plant in York County, Pa. The NRC refers the concern to plant owner Exelon and security provider Wackenhut.

Sept. 10: WCBS in New York informs the NRC that it has a videotape of guards asleep or nodding off in a “ready room” near the nuclear reactor.

Sept. 21: An NRC inspection confirms only the 10 guards caught on tape were sleeping — only one of four shifts is implicated.

Nov. 1: Exelon terminates its contract with Wackenhut and takes over the plant’s security. Whistle-blower Kerry Beal, on leave during the investigation, is not among the Wackenhut guards rehired by Exelon.

Nov. 5: NRC inspectors follow up at Peach Bottom to ensure Exelon is correcting the problem.

December 2007-2008: NRC pledges to monitor Peach Bottom.

Baltimore Examiner, December 12, 2007

 

March 13, 2007

NRC: 2002 miscue accidental

 

In 2002, a plant security officer falsified fire watch logs at Peach   Bottom Atomic Power Station. 

A contracted security officer at Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station - who logged a fire watch he didn't actually perform - did not willfully falsify fire watch records, according to a U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission investigation.

In April 2002, a Wackenhut contract security officer did not conduct a required fire watch but indicated on a log sheet that the action had been completed, according to NRC Office of Investigations records.

While investigating an unrelated matter in July 2006, commission investigators learned about the 2002 missed fire watch, said Neil Sheehan, a commission spokesman.

Investigators discovered that the officer believed his missed fire watch would be conducted by another officer during a scheduled tour of that same area. However, the second officer was assigned to cover the area once every four hours and not every hour as required to cover fire watches.

 

 

April 11, 2007 

Security guards to receive back wages 

 

The Miami-based company that employs guards at Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station has agreed to pay $129,953 in back wages to 157 workers at the nuclear-powered plant.

A U.S. Department of Labor's Wages and Hour Division investigation found that Wackenhut Corp. paid guards their regular rates of pay regardless of how many hours they worked.

A federal act states that employees must be paid time and a half should they work more than 40 hours per week.

In the case of Wackenhut Corp., the company required security guards to arm themselves prior to the start of their shift, said Leni Uddyback-Forston, a spokeswoman for the U.S. Department of Labor. "The arming-up process could take five to 15 minutes per employee each day" she said. "They were not being compensated for that time."

Also, regular changes to Wackenhut's work schedule resulted in some guards being paid for four hours at their regular rate instead of overtime pay, Uddyback-Forston said.

Wackenhut officers guard both Three Mile Island in Dauphin County and Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station.

A representative from Wackenhut Nuclear Services said he could not comment on the reimbursement of the Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station guards.

Wackenhut has paid more than 90 percent of the back wages owed, Uddyback-Forston said.

The company is in the process of reimbursing the remaining 26 of 157 guards affected, she said.

-Report by Sean Adkins of the York Dispatch

 

April 19, 2007

Plant owners request 'reduction' to code

 

Exelon Generation Company and AmerGen Energy Company asked the Nuclear Regulatory Commision for approval of a change to the required Quality Assurance Topical Report, required under federal code. The companies explained the requested changes to the fire protection program represents a "reduction in committment." 

The NRC said it would need more information to complete a review of the request. Federal code requires the NRC Safety Review Committee to inspect and audit the fire protection program, and the NRC asked the companies to describe how the topical report in question "establishes a requirement for the inspection and audit of the fire protection program." 

Twelve nuclear power plants would be included in the requested code change. 

-Marlene Lang 

 

 

April 26, 2007

Work hours to be limited for some nuclear plant workers

 

Security workers and others in critical jobs at the nation's nuclear plants will no longer be allowed to log excessive overtime hours under new rules approved by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

The change in the NRC's "fitness for duty" requirements is meant to reduce fatigue among plant employees and improve safety and security.

Exelon Nuclear, owner of Three Mile Island, Peach Bottom and Limerick nuclear stations in Pennsylvania, and seven other plants nationwide, expects to increase security staffing to reduce overtime.

"Any area where you have 24/7 coverage is most likely to be impacted," said Craig Nesbit, a spokesman for the company.

The regulations, which should go into effect this year, end a policy that allowed plant operators to meet work-hour limits by averaging the hours of dozens of employees. The process allowed some employees to log hundreds of hours of overtime a month. The new rule bases hourly limits on individuals.

The work-hour limits apply to security, maintenance and operations staffers, such as control room operators.

The rule is common sense, said Dave Lochbaum, a nuclear safety expert with the Union of Concerned Scientists, a Washington, D.C.-based watchdog group.

"Groups don't get tired. People do," he said.

David Desaulniers, an NRC staffer who helped shepherd the rule change through a seven-year administrative review, said the revision will improve plant safety.

"I think that what the commission has approved will be a substantial step forward in addressing worker fatigue issues in the future," said Desaulniers, senior human factors analyst for the agency.

The shortcomings of group averaging were evident at TMI, where some security officers employed by Wackenhut Nuclear Services logged 72-hour weeks for six weeks straight last year.

In 2005, TMI officials cited three security workers for being inattentive or sleeping on the job. Each incident occurred during the night shift. Security officers contacted by The Patriot-News at the time said the incidents were not surprising given the overtime officers were being compelled to work.

The NRC rule, which must undergo review by the federal Office of Management and budget before it goes into effect, also:

• Increases the minimum break between shifts from eight hours to 10.

• Establishes training requirements for fatigue management.

• Limits the reasons plant operators may waive the hourly limits.

• Revises drug- and alcohol-testing requirements.

 

A veteran security officer at TMI employed by Wackenhut welcomed the changes. "It will definitely keep things from getting really bad again like they were in '02 and '03," said the officer, who spoke on the condition that he not be identified.

Another officer, also requesting anonymity, said the change would significantly reduce fatigue. But he remained skeptical of how much leeway employers would have to waive the rules under special circumstances.

Though the NRC establishes the regulations, it does not require plants to obtain agency approval before authorizing a worker to go over the limit.

Eric Epstein, chairman of the Harrisburg-based watchdog group Three Mile Island Alert, had similar concerns. "I believe the standards are contingent upon voluntary compliance," he said. "I see nothing that suggests there will be more aggressive oversight of a new fitness-for-duty program."

-Report by Garry Lenton of the Patriot-News

 

April 30, 2007

NRC calls fudged fire checks "minor" 

 

The NRC wrote Peach Bottom to report on an investigation of Jan. 19, 2006 incident in which an employer deliberately did not make the fire protection surveillance rounds required, and falsified reports to say the checks were made. 

The NRC told Peach Bottom owner Exelon, "Because you are responsible for the actions of your employees, and because the violation was willful, the violation was evaluated under the NRC ... process. .... The NRC considered that the violation, absent willfullness, would be of minor safety significance because the fire safety equipment was maintained in a functional condition." 

The report went on to say: "However, the NRC escalated the severity level of Severity Level IV because the violation was a deliberate act." 

-Report by Marlene Lang

 

May 3, 2007 

NRC alerts power plants of fires

Operators told to review fire protection plans

 

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission informed power plant operators of two fire incidents, and their causes. 

On Aug. 15, 2006, at the Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, combustible, improperly installed roofing materials on an emergency diesel generator caught fire where it came into contact with a steel penetration sleeve which the generator's exhaust passes through. According to a letter from the NRC to nuclear plant operators, the fire smoldered for about 35 minutes, from the time it was fire identified until it was put out by the plant's in-house fire brigade. 

Peach Bottom found that some of the roofing materials were improperly installed back in 1997-98, and were abutting the steel sleeve. The report explained that during an extended run of the emergency generator the steel sleeve "heated to the point that it caused the adjacent roofing materials to ignite." The exhaust stack operates at about 900 degrees Fahrenheit, but asphalt roofing paper burns at about 400 degrees. 

 

Another fire occurred Aug. 18, 2006 at the Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit 1 reactor, during ventilation duct installation, through a concrete wall which served as a contamination barrier. A worker had stuffed combustible cotton rags around the venting, and sealed it with duct tape. When welding began, heat transfer through a metal sleeve box ignited the duct tape and rags. 

According to the NRC report, the burning rags and melting plastic fell through the concrete wall opening into the cable vault. Drops of hot burning plastic fell into conduit-protected cables. 

There was no continuous fire watch on the cable vault side of the fire barrier, but smoke from the burning plastic activated a smoke detector. The fire burned about six minutes, and was put out by hand, by a worker, the report said. 

 

Nuclear power plants were told to review their fire protection plans with this information in mind. No specific requirements were made, or specific actions required of plants. 

 

May 8, 2007 

Worker faking records was isolated case

 

Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station has not been cited even though a plant worker falsified records on two occasions, according to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

An NRC investigation substantiated that a low-level worker deliberately falsified fire-protection-surveillance records without the knowledge of plant management, according to an NRC document dated April 30.

Plant officials ran an investigation into the matter and fired the worker, the document states.

Exelon Nuclear checked the records of other operators to determine if anyone else was involved in the falsification of the records. The commission determined that the violation resulted from the isolated actions of one worker.

-Report by Sean Adkins of the York Dispatch

 

May 15, 2007

NRC finds partial-flow line under full-line use  

 

Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station credited individuals with performing the functions of a "senior operator" who were not actually senior operators (SOs). Technical specifications and federal code require a certain number of hours and functions to be done by SOs. NRC inspectors discovered that another classification of worker was performing tasks which SOs were to be doing, as required under the plant's license. 

The finding was classified as Green, with "very low safety significance." Owner Exelon was not cited, according to the NRC report of an inspection that ended March 31, 2007. 

The report also noted that a partial-flow flush line (part of a high pressure coolant injection (HPCI)/reactor core cooling line), was being used for full-flow testing. The use, for which the line was not designed, resulted in cracked piping to the torus, which had to be replaced, according to the NRC report. 

The finding was called "more than minor" and the report said the issue had been complex to evaluate. The matter was given Green categorization as "the probability of a large early release remained low." 

Inspectors also found that procedures for effluent monitoring were inadequately established and maintained. Procedures were not adequate to detect "non-representative sampling of the 'B' train of the main stack particulate effluents sampling system." 

The finding potentially affects public health and safety, but was considered of very low safety significance because it did not involve radioactive material. The NRC report also noted that personnel were not trained properly in the procedures. 

None of the violations were cited, according to the NRC. 

-Report by Marlene Lang 

 

June 26, 2007 

NRC finds 2 violations, untimely corrections, makes no citations

 

An NRC inspection completed on April 21, 2006 reported that in March 2006 Peach Bottom operators failed to ensure that test procedures for the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) and the reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) pump had acceptance criteria incorporating limits from design documents. Failing to stay within the limits for which the pump was designed could degrade the pump to a lower limit could interfere with proper flow and discharge pressure. The subsequent inspection, completed May 18, 2007, found that the March 2006 problem was not corrected. 

The NRC inspectors reported that Peach Bottom owner Exelon had not revised the procedure "and had continued to conduct the surveillance test 13 times since the issue was discovered by the NRC." 

An Exelon evaluation found the pumps currently met the design basis requirements and were operable, according to the report. "Exelon failed to take prompt corrective actions to address a safety issue in a timely manner," commensurate with safety significance and complexity," the report stated. 

The matter did not result in citation because it did not represent a loss of system safety function. 

A second violation also did not receive citation. Peach Bottom failed to correct a condition deemed "adverse to quality" for 22 months. The condition was associated with pressure boundary leakage, the NRC report explained. In July 2005 the NRC noted the plant had not promptly evaluated a steam leak on a high pressure coolant injection valve. The NRC report said Exelon "did not take corrective actions to address a safety issue in a timely manner."

 

July 30, 2007 

Inspection notes failures to follow procedures

 

The NRC followed up on a fire and other problems at the Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station in a three-month inspection that ended June 30. 

No citations were made for three incidents, two of which involved violations of NRC requirements, according to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission report. 

An incorrect size matchup on a breaker caused a fire at the '4T4' 480 volt load center, NRC inspectors explained in a report that followed up on the "Unusual Event." 

The February 2007 fire was a result of human error, according to the report, which explained that "an incorrect frame size breaker was installed into a cubicle for which it was not sized. This mismatch caused an electrical fault that led to a fire and a plant transient that upset plant stability." Operators responded to the fire and "equipment losses" by cutting reactor power to half its normal rate.

NRC inspectors determined the "root cause" of the fire to be "that standards, policies, and administrative controls were not used." Maintenance technicians did not strictly follow instructions to verify the frame size during the overhaul of a spare breaker.

The finding was labeled Green and "of very low safety significance" because it did not increase the likelihood of a plant shutdown or the likelihood that mitigation equipment functions would not be available. 

The report also noted that a missed procedure step in a surveillance test resulted in an unplanned overloading of an emergency diesel generator on March 15, 2007. This also was due to human error, according to the NRC report, which explained that workers did not follow procedure when the overload happened. 

Other emergency generators remained operable. The generator that was overloading was out of service for less than the specified outage time allowed, of seven days. The finding was labeled Green and Exelon was not cited. 

In a third Green finding, the NRC said operators failed to follow procedures while manipulating a diesel-driven fire pump cooling water valve on May 23, 2007. The improper manipulation led to misalignment of the fire pump cooling water that subsequently damaged the entire engine during operations without cooling water, the report explained. The fire pump was rendered inoperable by the damage to the engine. 

The report said operators were not provided complete and accurate instruction for cleaning the cooling water strainer, which contributed to the situation. The finding was considered of very low safety significance. 

Exelon was not cited. 

-Report by Marlene Lang

 

Aug. 31, 2007 

Performance review by NRC give good marks

 

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission announced the completion of its performance review of the Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station for the first half of 2007. The report said the plant operated in such a way as not to require any additional NRC oversight beyond the regularly scheduled inspections. Those inspections were outlined in the letter to Exelon president Christopher Crane. 

-Report by Marlene Lang 

 

 

August 2007

File closed on allegation 

 

NRC's Region I office which oversees Peach Bottom closed the file on the allegations made in a letter by a Wackenhut Corp. supervisor that security officers were working too long and taking naps on duty, saying the accusation was unsubstantiated. 

-Report by Marlene Lang 

 

September 2007 

News station WCBS in New York provided the NRC Region I office with a videotape that depicted inattentive security officers on duty at the Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station. "The videotape was broadcast on national television and resulted in considerable congressional and public concern," an NRC memo noted in Aug. 2008. 

 

Nov. 28, 2007 

Security issues prompt more inspections for Peach Bottom

 

Between March and August of 2007, Kerry Beal videotaped 10 of his fellow Wackenhut Corp. officers at the Peach Bottom plant napping in a secure location of the plant while on the job. 

Beal reportedly tried to report the incidents within his chain of command on duty, but then turned the tape over to WCBS news in New York. 

The incident prompted Exelon to fire Wackenhut from serving at the Peach Bottom plant. Exelon will conduct more inspections and is reviewing whether to continue contracts with Wackenhut for security at Exelon's other nine nuclear power plants. 

An NRC investigation also found officers has slept on duty at least four times between February and August 2007. However, the NRC determined that the plant's security program was not significantly degraded as a resulted. 

Increased NRC inspections will review the plant's transition to an in-house security force. 

-Report by Garry Lenton of the Patriot News

 

Feb. 5, 2008

Peach Bottom plant repairs safety valve

 

Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station operators shut down Unit 3 this morning to repair a safety valve.

The valve prevents steam lines to the electric turbine from becoming over-pressurized, said Bernadette Lauer, power station spokeswoman.

In a release, Lauer said the plant's operators are investigating the cause of the equipment malfunction. There was no risk to the public, she said.

Unit 2 continues to operate at full power. Units 2 and 3 are boiling water reactors, and Unit 2 is capable of generating approximately 1,138 net megawatts and Unit 3 is capable of generating approximately1,140 net megawatts.

-Report by York Daily Record/Sunday News

 

Feb. 8, 2008 

Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station's Unit 3 reactor came back online at 3:30 p.m. Thursday after workers had replaced a safety relief valve that had malfunctioned earlier this week.

Peach Bottom's Unit 2 reactor continued to operate at full power without interruption during the Unit 3 shutdown.

-Report by Sean Adkins of the York Dispatch

 

Feb. 14, 2008

Inspection finds one violation 

 

An integrated inspection by the NRC found one violation deemed of low safety significance at the Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, according to a report by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Exelon was not cited for the "failure to include the reactor building equipment and floor drain plugs in the scope of the Maintenance Rule program." Because of this, the station "did not recognize that appropriate preventive maintenance was not being performed," the report stated. 

Inspectors noted that the finding indicated a failure of problem identification and resolution, because the procedures did not contain lessons learned from a similar event in February 2007. 

-Report by Marlene Lang 

 

March 3, 2008 

Annual Assessment calls for heightened oversight of guards, security

 

The NRC has called for "additional regulatory oversight" of Peach Bottom's performance, as a result of security officer inattentiveness revealed in the last quarter of 2007. The inspection covered all of 2007 and the plant was found to have performed satisfactorily in areas related to reactor and radiation safety. 

However, enhanced oversight will include additional inspections in the areas of security force performance monitoring, corrective actions, safety conscious work environment (SCWE) and completion of commitments. 

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission's report on the annual inspection told Exelon that "behaviors and interactions within the security organization did not encourage the free flow of information related to raising safety issues." 

This presumably was a reference to media reports that the Wackenhut Corp. security officer who videotaped his fellow officers sleeping on the job, claimed he had tried to report the problem within the work environment and was met with no action, before he gave the recording to local media.

The plant receive a White rating for the violations.  

-Report by Marlene Lang

Here is a brief recount of the events which led to the heightened oversight: 

March 2007: John Jasinski sends the Nuclear Regulatory Commission a letter alleging guards are sleeping throughout the nuclear plant in York County, Pa. The NRC refers the concern to plant owner Exelon and security provider Wackenhut.

 

Sept. 10: WCBS in New York informs the NRC that it has a videotape of guards asleep or nodding off in a “ready room” near the nuclear reactor.

 

Sept. 21: An NRC inspection confirms only the 10 guards caught on tape were sleeping — only one of four shifts is implicated.

 

Nov. 1: Exelon terminates its contract with Wackenhut and takes over the plant’s security. Whistle-blower Kerry Beal, on leave during the investigation, is not among the Wackenhut guards rehired by Exelon.

 

Nov. 5: NRC inspectors follow up at Peach Bottom to ensure Exelon is correcting the problem.

 

December 2007-2008: NRC pledges to monitor Peach Bottom.

Baltimore Examiner, December 12, 2007

 

April 9, 2008

NRC announcing meeting with Exelon over safety issues 

 

Officials of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission will meet with Exelon Generation Co. representatives to discuss the results of an NRC inspection that focused on "safety conscious work environment" (SCWE). The inspection and the meeting are in response to incidents related to Wackenhut Corp. security offiicers who were found sleeping on the job and the related issue of why incidents were not reported before a worker took a videotape to the media. Wackenhut has provided security guards on a contract basis to several of Exelon's plants, but since the incident, Peach Bottom and others have turned to in-house security. 

The NRC requires that license holders, like Exelon, "maintain an environment in which safety issues are promptly identified and effectively resolved and employees feel free to raise safety concerns," according to an NRC announcement of the April 15 meeting. 

In another NRC press release the same day, the agency proposed a $130,000 civil penalty against a nuclear power plant in Florida, 30 miles south of Miami, after a 2006 investigation found Wackenhut-employed security officers there sleeping on duty over a period of two years. The release said that on April 6, 2006, a security officer was seen by an NRC inspector sleeping while on duty at a post in a vital area of the reactor. 

-Report by Marlene Lang 

 

May 6, 2008

Fire bridgade 'deficient' 

 

An integrated inspection of the Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station by the NRC ended March 31, 2008 and resulted in one "more than minor" finding that was not cited. 

According to the report, numerous fire brigade deficiencies were not discussed at a post-drill critique or documented in a fire drill record, resulting in fire brigade deficiencies. Among the undocumented deficiencies: the brigade opened a hot door to a fire area with no protective equipment on; the supervisor gave orders to sway, rather than shut down, lubricating oil pumps during the fire, failing to take the most conservative action as required. This failure went unrecognized by other team members and evaluators. Also, the fire brigade was not aware of the status of the sprinkler system, to ensure that it was actuated, and the team failed to set the ventilation system to remove smoke from the room, until prompted by the drill instructor. 

The crew with observed "deficiencies" was one of five on site, and the only one with problems. 

The violation was not cited. 

-Report by Marlene Lang 

 

May 9, 2008

Emergency exercises assessed, need improvement: FEMA

 

A regional administrator for FEMA informed Maryland's Director of Emergency Management that the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the Department of Homeland Security held radiological emergency preparedness exercised at Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station on April 22, 2008 and that four deficiencies occurred during the exercises. 

One deficiency was that Harford County, Md., emergency operations were not coordinated with other jurisdictions and were not preceded by siren activation. 

There were similar coordination problems with Cecil County, Md., where problems arose related to communication with media during an emergency. Maryland municipalities participate in the exercises because of their proximity to the Peach Bottom plant in southern York County, Pa.

-Report by Marlene Lang 

 

May 21, 2008

Inspectors: Required battery test was not being performed

 

In an NRC Component Design Bases inspection completed April 11, 2008, one violation was identified at the Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station.

According to the NRC's report, Exelon, owner of Peach Bottom, did not verify that certain battery connection resistances were within the limits of technical specifications. The report stated that Exelon had exempted the inter-tier connections (those between cells using cables vise steel bars) from the testing requirement. When Exelon did perform the exempted test, it was discovered that one of four cables on a Unit 2 battery was about the specified limit. 

An evaluation of the violation showed the degraded connection would not have prevented the battery from fulfilling its safety function, the report stated. 

Because safety function was not lost, the finding was given a Green rating and was not cited. 

-Report by Marlene Lang 

 

 

May 27, 2008

Work environment study complete

 

After heightened oversight and additional inspections following incidents of sleeping guard, the NRC reported on its inspection of 'safety conscious work environment,' (SCWE). Exelon was to resolve work environment issues related to inattentive security guard issue identified in Sept. 2007. 

According to the NRC report on the special inspection, 150 employees of the Peach Bottom plant participated in discussions on work environment issues. Inspectors determined that the SCWE survey was conducted in a manner that encouraged candid and honest responses and that survey results compared "favorably with industry norms." Exelon determined that there were some negative perceptions of the Employee Concerns Program among workers, regard confidentiality and effectiveness. 

There were also perceptions of inconsistent standards and direction during refueling outages, and Exelon was to address this and other "perceptions" about adverse reaction for raising issues. During focus group meetings, inspectors could not find any instances where retaliation had happened as a result of someone raising safety issues, the report stated. 

The report noted that Exelon had already begun the transition to an in-house security force. 

The report said Exelon's self-assesment "resulted in a reasonabley complete understanding of the SCWE" at Peach Bottom. 

-Report by Marlene Lang 

 

June 5, 2008

Radioactivity dose assessment not adequate, NRC says

 

Exelon violated federal code by not providing a means to continually assess the impact of the release of radioactive materials, in its 'dose assessment' program. According the a Nuclear Regulatory Commission report on an evaluation of an April 23 emergency preparedness exercise.

The assessment procedures and programs at the Peach Bottom plant limited assessment to only those conditions in which "the fuel clad barrier was lost or potentially lost," with instruction to operators telling them, in fact, not to take dose assessment protective action in cases where there was no loss or potential loss of the fuel clad. the report explained. 

The report stated, The (NRC) inspectors observed during the April 23, 2008 exercise that before the fuel clad barrier had been declared potentially lost, a plant release was in progress while radiation readings in the Unit 2 drywell exceeded 600 rad/hour." 

Inspectors noted that otherwise, asssessments were being conducted as prescribed. 

The finding was classified as Green and of very low safety significance and was not cited, the report stated. 

-Report by Marlene Lang

 

June 25, 2008 

NRC inspectors found three violations of "very low safety significance" in a team inspection completed May 16 at Peach Bottom. 

The findings were rated Green and Exelon was not cited. NRC documents specifying the nature of the violations were not available. 

 

July 15, 2008

NRC checks on progress in sleeping guard remedies

 

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission continued its follow-up response to inattentive security officers and issues related to "safety conscious work environment" (SCWE) with an inspection at the Peach Bottom plant. The June 6, 2008 visit was to determine Exelon's progress in meeting the commitments it made to address the issues. 

The inspection looked into the transition from a contracted to an in-house security force, a review of Peach Bottom's evaluation of the "root cause" of the problem and its effectiveness and an inspection of activities related to work environment issues (SCWE). 

The NRC reported that no findings of significance turned up in the inspection and all actions to which Peach Bottom committed were considered closed, with two exceptions. Exelon would have to perform safety conscious work environment surveys at its other plants, and those survey results would have to be discussed. 

It also remains for Exelon to submit written confirmation that all items have been completed. 

-Report by Marlene Lang

 

Aug. 12, 2008 

Material found in sprinkler system valve

 

An integrated inspection of Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station completed on June 30, 2008 by the NRC noted only on finding of "very low safety significance." 

The Green level finding was made by maintenance personnel who discovered foreign material inside a supply valve to an automatic 13KV switchgear sprinkler system. The system is important to the plant's fire protection program. The material was removed. 

Exelon was not cited. 

-Report by Marlene Lang 

 

Aug. 22, 2008

Regional NRC office under review for response to sleeping guards

Office of Inspector General find Region I assessment 'inconsistent'

 

The NRC Office of the Inspector General reviewed whether its Region I office responded adequately in handling the letter it received in March 2007 alleging security officers were sleeping on the job at Peach Bottom, and concluded the Region I office was inconsistent in its response. 

(For background, see Chronology entries beginning March 20, 2007.)

According to a memo from the Inspector General to the Region I office of the NRC, the regional staff received the letter on March 27 and held a board meeting to evaluate it on March 29 and again on April 11, 2007. Prior to the two board meetings, an NRC engineer had been assigned to check out the relevant history of allegations at Peach Bottom. The engineer returned an e-mail report on March 28, stating there had been three previous allegations in 2005 related to Peach Bottom security; one about overtime and fatigue, one concerning retaliation against security officers and one allegation of security officers sleeping in the towers. 

None of the allegations were substantiated, the engineer reported, also noting that there were some inconsistencies in the stories of the sleeping officers because it would be impossible to observe anyone sleeping inside the towers from outside. 

The review also discussed an interview the Inspector General's office made of the Wackenhut security manager who made the original report of the inattentiveness. That manager said there was a fear of retaliation among guards, and said he had reported that fear to Exelon and Wackenhut. He also said he told Exelon that conditions in the "ready room" at the Peach Bottom plant were "not conducive to remaining alert." The ready room is an area where officers not on patrol may relax, but are ready to respond as needed.

The manager said he had suggested in a March 2007 letter approaches for catching the sleeping guards. 

The Wackenhut manager claimed he had forwarded his concerns to the NRC on behalf of the security officers because they afraid of retaliation if they raised concerns, according to the memo. 

NRC's Region I office referred the March 2007 concerns to Exelon in a letter on April 30, 2007. Three concerns were emphasized: 1) guard sleeping on duty, 2) guards fearing retaliation if they reported safety concerns, and 3) that Exelon was aware of the officers sleeping on duty and was not taking action. 

Exelon responded in a letter on May 30, 2007, saying the concerns were not substantiated, based on several points. 1) Exelon had measures in place to reduce potential for inattentiveness, such as random radio checks, requirements for officers to walk around every 15 minutes, random observations of officers in the tower post, and supervisor visits twice per 12-hour shift. 2) Interviews did not confirm the allegations, 3) reviews of corrective actions reports did not show reluctance to report safety problems, and 4) officer work hour averages were lower than NRC limits. 

The NRC Inspector General office noted that the NRC's May 30, 2007 letter did not contain any documents to support its evaluation of the safety concerns. The memo also explained that the two Exelon investigators who reviewed the March 2007 concerns concluded that the allegations were unsubstantiated. The Inspector General also noted that those Exelon investigators said at the time that they would have liked to have had more information from the Region I office about the concerns. But Region I said, in the past, Exelon had asked for more information when needed. 

In May 2007, the Region I Division of Reactor Projects recommended the allegation file be closed, the memo said. The Region I Division of Reactor Safety delved into Exelon's response in a bit more detail, looking at how the random checks were implemented, how often, how many officer were checked and how checks were documented. That director concluded, also in May, that Exelon's response to the safety concerns was reasonable and sufficient in both depth and scope. 

However, an engineer for the Division of Reactor Projects noted that Exelon might have interviewed a larger number of personnel, and said that he was unaware, at the time he made his review of Exelon's response to the concerns, that no security officers were interviewed from the team with the allegedly inattentive officers. 

NRC's Region I Division of Reactor Safety pointed out that Exelon never explained exactly what was meant by "random observations," whether that meant post checks or visual observation and noted that observation of the Bullet Resistant Enclosure (BRE) tower guards was "not feasible." Others on the Region I staff agreed it would be hard to "sneak up" on BRE guard to check on inattentiveness. 

The NRC's Office of the Inspector General found that the NRC's Region I office was "inconsistent" in its assessment of the safety significance of the two allegations, made within six months of each other, expressing similar concerns about inattentive security officers at the Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station. The inconsistencies were in relation to allegations that officers feared retaliation if they reported safety concerns, and the allegation that Exelon was aware that officers were inattentive on duty but did not take action to address the matter. 

The Inspector General's report noted that the Region I staff did not question the information they were given by Exelon and did not probe or attempt to verify it. 

The NRC memo said that Region I staff could have contacted the former Wackenhut security manager to obtain more specifics, could have provided Exelon with more detailed information, could have provided the information to the NRC's resident inspectors at Peach Bottom for increased monitoring of guard activities, and could have assigned Region I security inspectors to look into the March 2007 concerns during a baseline inspection that took place from April 30 to May 4, 2007. 

-Report by Marlene Lang 

 

Aug. 28, 2008

Inspection procedures complete regarding inattentive guards

NRC: Matter closed

 

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission completed its inspection and review of Peach Bottom's "inattentive security guard events" and concluded that "the licensee (Exelon) has adequately addressed the commitments/actions described in (Confirmatory Action Letter) 1-07-005; the NRC has reasonable assurance that the Peach Bottom facility will continue to be operated safely; and adequate corrective actions have been taken to prevent reoccurrence of the underlying issues that led to the inattentive security officer events." 

A letter to Exelon from the NRC said that the company would be expected to fulfill its commitment to conduct "safety conscious work environment" (SCWE) surveys of security organizations at all it nuclear reactor sites it identify any actions that need to be taken, and to inform the NRC by Oct. 31, 2008 of survey completion so that a meeting can be scheduled to discuss the results. 

Additionally, the NRC gave Exelon a "White" level safety finding related to the incidents and for having "an ineffective behavior observation program." 

-Report by Marlene Lang

 

Aug. 29, 2008

Supplemental inspection finds nothing 'significant'

Inspectors conclude management of guards was 'inadequate'

 

An NRC inspection, completed July 25, 2008, examined Exelon's response at Peach Bottom to a previous "White" level finding related to inattentive security officers. The report on the supplemental inspection stated no findings of significance were identified. 

The report also stated that Exelon's comprehensive evaluation of the security officer inattentiveness issue determined three root causes. They were: 1) Inadequate Exelon management oversight and leadership of Wackenhut Nuclear Security management to ensure appropriate security force perfomance. 2) Wackenhut Nuclear Security failed to provide adequate oversight of security force performance, and 3) an adverse culture of inattentiveness and non-compliance with the behavior observation program existed within the Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station security organization.

The report stated Exelon had addressed the issue acceptably, but the matter would be considered in assessing plant performance in future assessments, through the third quarter of 2008.  

-Report by Marlene Lang

 

Oct. 10, 2008 

Water leak in containment area not analyzed 

 

NRC inspectors found Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Unit 1 reactor had failed to perform periodic radiological analysis of water in the containment vessel, as required by federal code. 

An inspection conducted in July and August 2008 found that water that had accumulated in the containment vessel on the 87-foot, 9-inch elevation under a removable floor plate in a hallway was not analyzed. The water "intruded" into the Unit 1 containment vessel and the radioactive waste building, the report stated. The water accumulated was less than the code specification limit of 500 gallons. According to the report, the water had been there since "at least January 2005."

The finding was considered a Level IV violation, but was not cited, as Exelon "initiated a plan to restore compliance." 

Inspectors also found that Peach Bottom had failed to properly keep records related to decommissioning, not maintaining or referencing the location of all required records "important to the safe and effective decommissioning of the facility." The site file contained a list of "spills and released from 1976 to 2004" but it did not contain other required records and their locations, as code demands. 

Owner Exelon was not cited for the Level IV violation. 

-Report by Marlene Lang 

 

 

November 13, 2008

NRC inspects Peach Bottom plant, finds three violations, makes no citations 

 

A Sept. 30, 2008 inspection of the Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2 and 3 by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission found three violations by owner Exelon Generation Company LLC, though no citation were made. 

In a self-revealing non-cited violation, a failure to follow procedure was revealed after an emergency service water leak (ESW) was discovered on the E-1 emergency diesel generator (EDG), according to the NRC's report, dated Nov. 13, 2008. The report said the leak "resulted in safety-related equipment being adversely affected." 

The NRC determined the finding was of "very low safety significance," or Green level, because it did not represent an actual loss of system safety function. 

Also, a transformer fire and petroleum spill were not properly reported to the NRC, according to the NRC report. A Level IV Severity event, NRC inspectors noted the NRC was not notified by the Peach Bottom Power Station of the reportable event on July 23 and 24, 2008. Inspectors found a planned press release and notification of other government agencies concerning the transformer fire and petroleum spill. The NRC report state "the failure to make a required report could adversely impact the NRC's ability to carry out its regulatory mission," and that the event was related to public health and safety as it contributed to the loss of the plant's three offsite power sources. The event was also noted as an environmental protection issue because "it involved the spill of more than minor quantity of oil the required reporting to the state of Pennsylvania." 

Because the NRC had been "informally notified," the NRC determined the finding was a non-citation violation. 

NRC inspectors also found the Peach Bottom plant did not conduct a sufficient quality assurance program, adequate to identify incorrect gamma spectroscopy analyses of a principal gamma emitting radionuclide used to scale hard-to-detect radionuclides for purposes of waste classification in accordance with 1- CFR  61.55. The report noted, "The failure to conduct a sufficiently robust quality assurance program ... is a performance deficiency that was reasonably within the licensee's ability to foresee and correct." The NRC called the finding "more than minor" because it affect the plant's "cornerstone objective" by failing to identify incorrectly anylyzed samples used to classify radioactive waste for land disposal. 

The finding was considered of "low safety significance" because no radiation limits were exceeded, there was no breach of packaging and no certificate of compliance finding, no low-level burial ground non-conformance, and no failure to make notifications or provide emergency notification. 

- Report by Marlene Lang 

 

Dec. 10, 2008

Hunters trespass on power plant property

Several hunters were found to be trespassing on company property in the vicinity of the north substation of the Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station. 

The incident was classified as an Event of Potential Public Interest (EPPI) by officials, who issued a report for Units 2 and 3 around 1 p.m. on Dec. 10. 

The state Department of Environmental Protection Bureau of Radiation Protection was notified along with Military and Veteran Affairs, the Public Utility Commission, state police, officials of Chester, York and Lancaster counties and PEMA's central office. 

-Report by Marlene Lang

 

 May 12, 2009

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NRC inspection finds plant departed from code in analyzing spent fuel pools

 

NRC inspectors who completed a quarterly inspection of the Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station on March 31, 2009 found three violations at the plant.

Two were rated “Green” findings but a third was considered a Severity Level IV violation, but none were cited, according to the NRC report of the inspection.

 

In one case, NRC inspectors reported that inadequate work instructions resulted in a momentary shorting of a terminal lead during maintenance, causing an inadvertent one-hour shutdown of reactor Unit 3. A containment isolation valve signaled the shutdown.

The report explained, “Work instructions allowed technicians to lift and manipulate energized leads on a safety-related pressure switch, without providing any guidance as to the risk and consequences that inadvertent grounding of those leads could cause.”

The report also stated that the failure “could reasonably be viewed as a precursor to a major event.” The valves in question “failed closed,” the report stated, and “did not represent an actual open pathway in the physical integrity of reactor containment.”

The failure to “provide appropriate risk insights” to workers was a human performance and work control issue, according to the inspectors’ report.

This finding was rated Green and was not cited.

In another “Green” inspection finding, a partial shutdown of the Unit 3 reactor occurred on Jan. 26, 2009 when the ‘A’ Wide-Range Neutron Monitoring (WRNM) became inoperable due to “inadequate procedural guidance regarding adjustments to the mean square voltage offset during the outage.”

The same NRC report described workers’ failure to make a “smooth transition” when shutting down the Unit 3 reactor to replace a main transformer, triggering a partial shutdown or “half-scram,” in industry terms.

The full explanation of the incident explained that the neutron monitor read a certain noise as mean square voltage (MSV) fluctuation within the reactor core. To compensate, the MSV was adjusted to a value of 8E9, though the MSV offset cannot be set higher than 3E8. According to the report, a system manager had specifically said this, but personnel performing the work did not “address the comments,” and this mis-adjustment caused the failed “smooth transition” and a sudden shift in the WRNM, which in turn generated the shutdown signal.

An NRC analysis of the incident concluded that the “deficiency,” or cause of the incident was the use of only two, instead of the required three operable WRNMs, on the Reactor Protection System (RPS) trip, when transferring to “Mode 2.”

The Severity Level IV code violation was noted because the Peach Bottom plant had used a spent fuel pool criticality analysis methodology that was not previously approved by the NRC, departing from the code-prescribed method and failing to obtain NRC approval or a license amendment to do so.

The methodology relates to degraded Boroflex in the high density spent fuel storage racks. Peach Bottom was using a formula to calculate density that differed from the federal code’s formula, mixing existing and new methodologies within the system.

The finding could affect the functionality of the fuel barrier (cladding), the report said, but stated the condition was of very low safety significance.

Peach Bottom agreed to correct the problem by coming up with an evaluation method adequate for testing safety of the spent fuel pool storage racks in accordance with federal code.

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-Report by Marlene Lang