March 5, 1993 - The NRC issued a Notice of Violation "related to an event
which resulted when an Auxiliary Operator (AO) bypassed river water from both
Decay Heat Service Coolers (DC-C -2A/B) affecting both trains of the Decay
Heat Closed Cooling Water System" (GPU Nuclear response to NOV, August 17,
1993.)
June 18, 1993 - GPU took the 'A" emergency diesel generator out of service
four days earlier for the annual maintenance inspection. An NRC inspector
noted a discrepancy on testing patterns on June 14, 1993, and on June 18
"while performing post-maintenance testing on the 'A' emergency diesel
generator (EDG), the licensee noted that while the diesel was paralleled to
off-site power, the diesel electrical load was erratic" (IR 50-289/93-13 &
50-320/93-06.)"
June 24 - July 1, 1993 - During an NRC inspection, the staff found an
"inadequate surveillance procedure, the bolts for the 'B' diesel generator (EDG)

lubricating oil filter cover were not properly torqued. As a result, the
ability of the EDG to continue to perform if called upon in an emergency was
uncertain." A Notice of Violation was issued. (IR 50-289/93-14.)
July 2, 1993 - An NRC inspection identified weaknesses in the licensee and
local law enforcement agency "intrusion protection strategy" (See February 7
and August 11, 1993 and September 22, 1995 for related incidents.) (IR
50-289/93-12.)
August 1 to September 9, 1993 - During this inspection the following problems
were identified: "...inadvertent auto-start of the motor driven emergency
feedwater pumps, the inadvertent lifting of the pressurizer power operated
relief valve, and the disabling of make pump 1C...movement of fuel with
reactor building doors open..." (IR 50-289/93-19.)
August 11, 1993 - The NRC issued two Notice of Violations relating to
emergency preparedness (EP) One violation occurred during the EP exercise
conducted from June 7-11, 1993 and involved adequacy of fire protection exit
provisions. The other violation dates back to February 7, 1993, and is related
to a delay in callout of the emergency response organization. (This violation
is being "considered for escalated enforcement." (See February 7 and July 2,
1993 for more information.) (IR 50-289/93-08.)
September 10, 1993 - The plant was shut down for a six-week re-fueling outage.
Eighty of the 177 fuel rods were replaced, bringing the total to more than 500
(or 265 metric tons) which have accumulated since the plant started operated
in 1974. (When the plant began operation, refueling outages were annually.
GPU has now requested, and received, permission to refuel every 24 months.)
GPU has claims to have enough storage space in their spent fuel pools to
continue accumulating fuel rods until 2014 (D ate of license expiration.)
As one worker said, "The brass here figures if one woman can have a baby in
nine months, maybe nine women can have a baby in one month. So they're
bringing more than a thousand workers and are aiming to have this shutdown one
of the shortest ever."
September 10, 1993 - "While the plant was shutdown and in mid-loop operation,
the licensee shifted electrical power supplies to support maintenance
activities, and caused an inadvertent increase in core thermocouple
temperatures of about 11 [degrees] F due to a decrease in cooling flow to the
decay heat removal heat exchanger" (IR 50-289/93-22.)
September 15, 1993 - During surveillance testing, "250 gallons of water leaked
from the 'C' makeup pump casing drain valve, MU-V-172C, because the valve
had been inadvertently left open approximately 1.5 turns." (IR 50-289/93-22.)
September 20, 1993 - During testing, an "inadvertent" trip of the reactor
protection system channel 'D' occurred.
September 22, 1993 - During a 90 minute interval, "4,600 gallons of water were
inadvertently transferred from the reclaimed water storage tank to the Reactor
Building sump...Maintenance personnel had opened the reclaimed water supply
valve, CA-V-194, to the reactor coolant drain (RCDT) which in turn overflowed
to the Reactor Building sump via the opening from the RCDT relief valve.
Operators were not alerted to the rising level in the RCDT, because the level
instrumentation and high level alarm were out of service." (IR 50-289/93-22.)
September 24, 1993 - "[D]ue to a level difference, about 4000 gallons of water
were inadvertently transferred from the fuel transfer canal to the
pressurizer..." (IR 50-289/93-22.)
September 25, 1993 - The 'A' emergency diesel generator was inadvertently
started.
September 30, 1993 - GPU declared an Event of Potential Public Interest"
due a small fire in the 'C' condensate pump.
October 4-8, 1993 - During an announced safety inspection of the radiation
program, the NRC issues a violation "regarding the control of personnel access
to high radiation areas to prevent inadvertent entry..." The NRC also observed
a weakness in "documentation of contractor health physics technicians'
qualifications" (IR 50-289/93-23.) (See August 7, 1996, for a related
incident.)
October 8, 1993 - "[W]hile filling the 'A' condensate storage tank (CST) from
the million gallon tank, 300 to 400 gallons of water spilled through the CST
vent." (IR 50-289/93-22.)
October 14, 1993 - During control rod drop testing, "One rod in each of rod
groups 1, 3 and 4 initially failed to meet the rod drop (flight) time..." (IR
50-289/93-22.)
October 14, 1993 - NRC staff reported:"...one day prior to startup from
the 10R refueling outage, the licensee noted that one of two reactor coolant
system (RCS) pressurizer code safety valves...was leaking at 25 gallons per
hour (gph). The leak gradually increased to 58 gph and on November 14, the
licensee placed the plant in hot shutdown to attempt to reseat the valve" (IR
50-289/93-25.)
"We found that your staff planned to slightly open the valve at power without
a sound technical basis for concluding that the valve would not fully lift. In
addition, your staff did not give sufficient consideration to the relative
risks of performing the evolution at power versus hot shutdown" (Lawrence T.
Doerflien, Chief, Projects Branch No. 4, Division of Reactor Projects, January
6, 1994.)
In other words: "They wanted to do something we didn't want them to do"
(Michelle Evans, NRC, February 25, 1994.)
October 15, 1993 - In response to (IN) 92-30, "Falsification of Plant
Records," a generic NRC initiative, the NRC "is concerned about the apparent
misconduct on the part of the plant individual involved with this record.
Because the NRC must be able to rely on the professionalism and integrity of
personnel who perform safety-related activities, including log taking and
record keeping, such misconduct cannot be tolerated." A NOV was issued.
October 22, 1993 - GPU's score during the latest SALP period was downgraded
from a "1" to a"2" in plant operations.
November 14, 1993 - The plant was shut down for a couple of days so GPU could
repair a pressurizer code safety valve leaking 720 gallons per day.
November 16, 1993 - "The licensee failed to establish an adequate procedure
for draining the reactor coolant system because the operating procedure did
not address how to minimize or prevent the spill over of reactor vessel water
into the cold legs as the cold legs are drained" (IR 50-289/94-02.) (See March
30, 1994 for Notice of Violation.)
January 27, 1994 - "Operations management determined that the day shift

Outbuilding Auxiliary Operator (AO), on January 27, 1994, inaccurately
reported log readings for the fire service water diesel pump without entering
the locked building" (IR 50-289/94-21.)
February 23, 1994 - GPU "determined that the spline adapters were installed
upside down [for the nuclear river water motor operated valves.]" (IR
50-289/94-13.) (See August 30 and September, 1994; August 17, 1995; and,
September 13, 1996 for related issues.) (See February 26, 1998 for follow-up
reprimand.)
March 5, 1994 - The reactor coolant system leak rate increased.
March 7, 1994 - GPU reduced power from 100% to 75% due to a leak on the
pressurizer spray valve. (See March 17 and May 31, 1994 for related
incidents.)
March 17, 1994 - The plant was shut down due to problems with the pressurizer
spray valve. (See March 7 and May 31, 1994.)
"Following the shutdown, c 1ontrol rod drive drop testing was performed,
and the licensee found that 12 control rod drives had excessive drop times"
(IR 50-289-/94-04.) The plant returned to operation on March 23, 1994. (See
September 9, 1995 for a related incident.)
March 30, 1994 - A severity level IV violation was issued by King of Prussia
for an incident that occurred on November 16, 1993. Another severity IV
violation was issued for inaccurate and incomplete log keeping related to the
river water fire service diesel.
May 23, 1994 - An auxiliary operator inadvertently reduced the level
deferential in the sodium hydroxide tank/borated water storage tank. The
incident prompted a License Event Report.
May 19, 1994 "...operators failed to recognize that the high range condenser
offgas radiation monitor (RM-A-5) was greater than the high alarm
setpoint, a condition requiring an Alert declaration. Channel RM-A-5 was in
alarm for approximately one hour before the alert condition was recognized.
The NRC considered this oversight to an [emergency preparedness] exercise
weakness." (IR 50-289/95-05.) (See June 2, 1995 for related incident.)
May 31, 1994 - GPU announced a planned shutdown for June 1, 1994 to test for
leaks in the condenser. "In March, GPU technicians discovered that 12 of the
69 control rods used to control the nuclear reaction failed to move into
position in the 1.66-second time period required by the NRC. Ability to move
the rods over the reactor's fuel is critical to plant safety, N RC
officials said" ("The Patriot News," May 31, 1994, B4.) (See March 7 and 17,
1994 for related information.)
June 6, 1994 - "A worker who was decontaminating piping failed to meet the
Radiation Protection Work permit clothing requirements when she treated an
area decontaminated before it was radiologically surveyed and released by a
Radiological Controls Technician" (Jacque P. Durr, Chief, Projects No. 4,
Division of Power Reactors, NRC.)
June 9, 1994 - TMI-1 returned to service after an eight day shutdown. During
the plant startup, with reactor power at 20%, the control room operator "noted
an unacceptable overlap between the average positions of control rod groups
six and seven." A Licensee Event Report was prepared by the licensee.(IR
50-289/94-13.) (See May 31, 1994 for related problems.)
June 29, 1994 - During an inspection of the boric acid corrosion program,
several weaknesses were identified including "...the lack of program
documentation, program awareness, and program preventive guidance to en
sure maintenance is performed on components identified as susceptible before
leakage can cause significant corrosion damage. Additionally, there is no
formal or documented centralized collection or evaluation group, or a formal
feedback mechanism for evaluation of leaks identified by non-surveillance
testing activities. These programmatic weaknesses may lead to the reduced
assurance that the reactor coolant boundary will have an extremely low
probability of abnormal leakage, rapid propagating failure, or gross rupture"
(Michael C. Modes, Chief, Materials Section, Division of Reactor Safety, NRC.)
July 11, 1994 - "Overall, your on-site response during the Annual Emergency
Preparedness Exercise was acceptable. However, the approximately one hour
delay in recognizing plant conditions warranted upgrading the emergency
classification to an Alert is considered to be a significant weakness"
(Jacques P. Durr, Chief, Projects No. 4, Division of Power Reactors, NRC.)
July 12, 1994 - A through wall leak was discovered in a safety related nuclear
service river water pipe.
August 9, 1994 - The NRC reported results of TMI's radioactive waste
management and transportation program and identified "minor weaknesses" in the
following areas: "auditors' training and qualifications, timeliness of
updating isotopic distribution (i.e., scaling) factors, and controls for
limiting the public dose from the storage of radioactive waste" (James H.
Joyner, Facilities Radiological Safety and Safeguards Branch, Division of
Radiation Safety and Safeguards, NRC, August 9, 1994.)
August 30, 1994 - After an inspection of TMI's motor-operated valve program
(MOV), NRC staff concluded: "While we recognize the positive actions taken to
improve the MOV program, your previous corrective actions have been
ineffective regarding the review of MOV test data. Specifically, your process
to evaluate dynamic test results is, in our estimation, informal and still
lacks adequate guidance for capability calculations. We also consider your
independent review of such calculations as not comprehensive. Consequently,
the violation cited as part of the NRC Inspection 92-80 will remain open for
further inspection" Eugene M. Kelly, Chief Systems Section, Division of
Reactor Safety. (See February 23, August 30 and September 9, 1994; August 17,
1995; and September 13, 1996 for related incidents. (See February 26, 1998
for follow-up reprimand.)
August 31, 1994 - Power was reduced from 100% to 10% to correct an
electro-hydraulic control circuit card problem. The problem affected the
position of the main turbine control valves.
August 31, 1994 - A Notice of Violation was issued for the incident which
occurred on May 23, 1994.
September 8, 1994 - Misalignment with a building spray [BS] transmitter valve
was documented by NRC inspectors. (A similar event occurred in June
1993.) "The BS flow instrument is an important indication used by the control
room operators to determine if the safety system is performing as designed in
normal and emergency situations" (IR 50-289/94-19.) A Notice of Violation was
issued
September 9, 1994 -A Severity Level IV Violation was issued for the following
incident: "The deferral/cancellation of preventive maintenance (PM) tasks on
safety-related motor-operated valves without a documented technical
justification or assessment of the adequacy of the PM program occurred because
Step 4.2.3.D of Ap was misinterpreted" (Richard W. Cooper II, Director,
Division of Reactor Projects.) (See February 23 and August 30, 1994; August
17, 1995; and, September 13, 1996 for related incidents.) (See February 26,
1998 for follow-up reprimand.)
September 16, 1994 - Power was reduced to 50% to test problems associated with
the condenser. "Small leaks in tubes inside the condenser are allowing
river water used for cooling to mix with pure water of the steam system" (GPU
Nuclear, "News Release," September 15, 1994.)
September 29, 1994 Thermal-Services-Inc. and its president Rubin Feldman, were
indicted September 29 by a federal grand jury on seven criminal charges,
including willful violations of the Atomic Energy Act, a decade-long
conspiracy to defraud the US government, false statements and more. The
charges are the culmination of a nearly two-year grand jury investigation of
the company, which manufactures Thermo-Lag, the ineffective fire barrier
material used in more than 70 nuclear reactors [including Three Mile Island]"
The Nuclear Monitor, , October 17, 1994.) (For follow-up data, see October 1,
1996 and May 29 and October 23, 1998.)
September 30, 1994 - A Notice of Violation was issued. "Your corrective
actions for a June 1993 building spray transmitter valve misalignment event
were ineffective in that they did not preclude the repetition of a similar
event on September 8, 1994. This violation is an example of the type of event
that could be prevented by a comprehensive root cause analysis and corrective
action program" (Jacque P. Durr, Chief Projects Branch No. 4, Division of
Reactor Projects, NRC, September 30, 1994.)
October 2, 1994 - The emergency diesel generator (EG-Y-B) started
automatically. "TMI failed to report the automatic actuation of an Engineered
Safety Feature within four hours as required by 10 CFR 50.72. Our decision not
to cite this item is based on the NRC enforcement policy goal of encouraging
licensees to aggressively and thoroughly pursue self-identification and
correction of problems" (Jacque P. Durr, Chief, Projects Branch No. 4,
Division of Reactor Projects, November 15, 1994.)
October 24, 1994 - The NRC inspection "team noted instances where
administrative requirements, which prescribe operator performance
standards, do not accurately reflect management expectations" (Richard W.
Cooper II, Director, Division of Reactor Projects.) A Notice of Violation was
issued.
November 4, 1994 - "Although our review revealed a number of issues, which
constituted a reduction in commitments from the plan previously accepted by
the NRC as tabulated in Attachment 1 [GPUN, April 19, 1994] the operation
quality plan continues to satisfy the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix E.
In the future, submittals should be made thoroughly evaluated to determine if
a change constitutes a reduction previously approved by the NRC" Michael C.
Modes, Chief, Materials
Section, Division of Reactor Safety. The NRC later asked GPU to "destroy" this
communication , because of "an inadequate review by the NRC" (Michael C.
Modes, December 5, 1994.)
December 1994 - GPU Nuclear joined a consortium of 33 nuclear utilities
pressuring the Mescalero Apaches to accept high-level radioactive waste. (See
June 1997 for a related development.)
December 3, 1994 - Power was reduced to 50% to repair a "water leak", i.e.
repair main condenser tube leaks. In addition, 145 of the condenser's
66,000 tubes were "removed." The plant returned to "full-power" on December
7, 1994.
"And the week of December 1 to 7, in fact readings were a bit higher. But
they were higher in all five [low-volume air sampler] stations...Could use a
control station...I'll try and get a hold of GPU next week and see if they got
same high readings...[May be] environmental blips we get once in awhile"
(John Leutzelschwab, December 24, 1994, phone message.)
December 5, 1994 - During a review of the Quality Assurance Plan a "number of
instances" were "revealed...which represent an apparent reduction in
commitment from the program previously accepted by the NRC..." (Michael C.
Modes, Chief, Materials Section, Division of Reactor Safety.)
December 15, 1994 - "Operators were investigating the decrease in power [plant
output] when a phone call from a member of the public alerted them of steam
coming from the turbine roof. This led them to identify that steam was flowing
through the relief valve for the 'A' second stage feedwater (FEW) heater (HV-
V-13A). This resulted in steam from the secondary plant being released to
atmosphere through MS-V-103 to the turbine building roof." (IR
50-289/94-26.)
January 10, 1995 - "...the inspectors did identify a tagging activity related
to the battery charger that was not well controlled due to an inconsistent
understanding of management's expectations for the control and restoration of
equipment" (Jacque P. Durr, Chief, Projects Branch No. 4, Division of Reactor
Projects.)
February 13, 1995 - "The inspector reviewed a radiological incident report
that documented the failure by radiological controls technicians to identify
contamination on the same individual on a number of occasions...The licensee's
staff calculated the
exposure to the worker from the contamination event and assigned 236 millirems
to the skin of the whole body." (NRC IR 50-289/95-09 & 50-320/95-03, September
29, 1995.)
March 7, 1995 - A reactor coolant leak of approximately 15 gallons per minute
developed.
March 8, 1995 - Radioactive water leaked and contaminated a worker. An
Unusual Event was declared.
June 2, 1995 - "An exercise weakness was identified in the area off-site dose
assessment and projection...One unresolved item was identified concerning your
protective action recommendation (PAR) logic's conformity with Federal
guidance...Your PAR logic diagram's methodology is overly reliant on
evacuation time estimates and release duration, without due consideration of
radiation doses that could be received." James H. Joyner, Chief, Facilities
Radiological Safety and Safeguards Branch, Division of Radiation Safety and
Safeguards, NRC.) (See May 19, 1994 for related incident.)
August 17, 1995 - "A weakness was noted in the plant response to the degraded
condition of the safety related 'B' nuclear river (NR) water pump discharge
check valve NR-V-20B. The check valve was declared inoperable after the plant
operators noticed the 'B' NR pump rotating backwards on two separate
occasions. When the problem was first noted on June 10, 1995, the check valve
condition, pump Y performance, and understanding of the pump discharge MOV
operation were not evaluated thoroughly
to ensure that the NR system was performing acceptably. The performance of the
pump inservice surveillance test on June 28, 1995, revealed that the condition
of the check valve was degraded. Ultimately, a thorough engineering
evaluation, performed at the request of the plant review group, did determine
that the NR system was operable between June 10 and 28, 1995." (Jacque P.
Durr, Chief, Projects branch No. 4, Division of Reactor Projects, NRC.) (See
October 10 and December 4, 1995 for follow-up.)
(See February 26, 1998 for a follow up reprimand relating to the MOV.)
September 9, 1995 - A non-isolable leak in the reactor coolant system located
in one of the cold legs of steam generator A was detected. GPU plans to weld
the fatigue crack.
Sept ember 9, 1995 - Several control rods exceeded the technical
specification (TS) drop time. "Of the seven rods exceeding the TS criteria,
four had exceeded the criteria in March [17] 1994, the other three had never
exceeded the criteria." (NRC, Region I.)
September 9, 1995 - Inspectors reviewed a crack in the reactor coolant system
drain line and identified the following weaknesses and errors: "(1) failures
in the design verification process, (2) discrepancies with design-related
documents, and (3) apparent weaknesses in engineering management's control of
the design process.
More significantly, while reviewing GPUN's response to past problems with the
drain lines, the inspectors identified activities that appear to be in
violation of NRC requirements." (Jame us T. Wiggins, NRC, Director, Division
of Nuclear Safety, November 7, 1995.) (See March 11, 1996 for a Severity Level
III Violation and October 29, 1996 for follow-up.)
September 12, 1995 - "There was a momentary interruption of decay heat removal
(DHR) flow to the reactor core due to an inadvertent closure of the pump
suction isolation valve DH-V-1." (See October 10, 1995.) (IR 50-289/95-13.)
September 22, 1995 - Four security breaches were reported to the NRC in
September 1995. (See February 7, 1993, October 10 and 11 and November 16,
1995 and March 1 and 26, 1996.)
September 28, 1995 - Approximately 23% of the fuel assemblies were discovered
to have excessive amounts of corrosion. (See March 13 and 31, 1992.)
October 10, 1995 - "A number of issues have occurred that raise concern
regarding the adequacy of your planning process for maintenance activities.
Examples of these include, maintenance on instrument line fittings which
resulted in a reactor coolant system leak, replacement of an emergency
safeguards actuation system relay that resulted in an interruption of decay
heat removal capability [See September 22, 1995] , and a weak initial response
to the degraded condition of the nuclear river discharge check valve that
resulted in a delay in identifying the degraded condition of the nuclear river
water system. [See August 17, 1995.] Most significant of the work planning
issues was the work on the circulating pumps that resulted in breaches of the
security boundary." (See September 22, 1995 for background data and October 11
and November 16,1995 for follow-up.) Richard W. Cooper, Division of Reactor
Projects, NRC.)
October 11, 1995 - "... one apparent violation was identified involving
multiple examples of failure to provide compensatory measures prior to causing
breaches in the protected area barrier." (C.W Hehl, Division of Nuclear
Materials Safety, NRC .) (See September 22, October 10 and November 16,
1995 and March 1 and 26, 1996.)
October 12, 1995 - An inadvertent heat sink protection system actuation
occurred for the 'B' OSTG.
October 31, 1995 - "...the pressurizer power operated relief valve (PORV), a
Class I valve, was returned to service without performing an IST [In Service
Testing] to verify proper valve operation after the PORV was replaced. As a
result, a wiring error, that prevented the PORV from opening in response to an
automatic manual signal, was not detected. Consequently, the PORV was
inoperable for the operating cycle from October, 1995, until September, 1997."
[NRC 50-289/97-09 (EA 97-533), May 1, 1998.] A Notice of Violation was issued
by the NRC.
(See January 27, 1998, for an incident involving the PORV.)
November 16, 1995 - A Violation of Security Level IV was issued for security
breaches that occurred, on or around, September 22, 1995. "...the NRC is
concerned with the manner in which the vulnerabilities were identified, t
he amount of time between identifying the first and the second vulnerability,
the thoroughness of the corrective actions, and the communication weaknesses
identified during the inspection." (James T. Wiggins, NRC, Division of Reactor
Safety, November 16, 1995.)
December 4, 1995 - The NRC identified an "area of concern" relating to "a
clogged strainer for a decay river pump. Considering the potential generic
concern with the other safety related river water pumps, it appears that a
more timely approach was warranted to ensure the operability of the non-
running pumps." (See August 10, 1995 for a related incident.)
Additionally, a Notice of Violation was issued "regarding failure to follow
radiological control procedures for control of a radiography area." (Peter W.
Eselgroth, Chief, Projects Branch No. 7, Division of Reactor Projects, NRC.)
December 6, 1995 - An inadvertent opening of an electrical breaker [RR-V-1A]
was identified by control room operators.
March 1, 1996 - The NRC identified an "a Apparent violation" which may
necessitate "escalated enforcement action."
The apparent violation involved the failure to provide adequate
compensatory measures during maintenance activities in the protected
area, which enhanced the potential for an unauthorized individual to
gain access from the owner-controlled area. Due to this event being
similar to other security events that occurred in September 1995 and for
which you were cited with a violation, the NRC is concerned about the
implementation and effectiveness of corrective actions to prevent
recurrence of that type of violation that were provided in your "Response
to Notice of Violation", dated December 20, 1995. Additionally, the NRC
interviews during the inspection period, as discussed with you, during the
inspection exit meeting on February 23, 1996, revealed that there is a
lack of alertness to security requirements by workers in the
Operations, Maintenance, Planning, and Security departments. (James T.
Wiggins, NRC, Director, Division of Reactor Safety.) (See March 26, 1996
for related event.)
March 11, 1996 - The NRC reprimanded GPU Nuclear and issued a Severity Level
III Violation for continued cracks and leaks in the reactor coolant system.
The NRC opted to waived a $50,000 fine and extended "credit" because TMI "has
not been the subject of escalated enforcement actions within the last 2
years..." The NRC noted chronic problems with drain lines. (See September 9,
1995. Also, see October 29, 1996 for follow-up.)
GPUN could provide no documentation to demonstrate that the
modifications were ever properly dispositioned. In addition, GPUN's
design verification process failed to identify a significant error in the
1990 analysis that resulted in GPUN underestimating the level of over
stress in the pipe. GPUN indicated to the NRC, at the pre-decisional
enforcement conference and during subsequent telephone conversations that
when the error in the 1990 analysis was corrected, the stresses in the
piping were approximately 100% above the code allowable. These failures led
to the RCS being returned to service in a degraded condition for the past
five years without any additional evaluation, monitoring or inspection,
until the support configuration was modified during the 1995 refueling
outage. (Thomas T. Martin, NRC, Regional Administrator.)
March 26, 1996 - The NRC issues another Severity Level III Violation for "a
security degradation that existed at the facility for approximately one day in
February 1996...This failure is significant because three similar
degradations had occurred in September 1995 (and were the subject of a
pre-decisional enforcement conference with you on October 25, 1995.) In our
view, the corrective actions taken in response to the violation cited for
those degradations should have prevented this recent violation from
occurring." However, the NRC once again issued GPU "credit" and opted not to
assess a base civil penalty of $50,000. (Thomas T. Martin, NRC, Regional
Administrator.) (See September 22, October 10 and November 16, 1995 and March
1, 1996, for related events.)
May 15, 1996 - A Severity Level IV violation was issued relating to a Senior
Reactor Operator's (SRO) "review of the Auxiliary Building filter
replacement, and subsequent shift SROs' and operations, management's decision
to wait for the Plant Review Group evaluation of the filter issue,
resulted in the untimely entry and documentation of the applicable 7 day TS
limiting condition for operation (LCO)." Peter W. Eselgroth, NRC, Chief,
Projects Branch No. 7, Division of Reactor Projects.)
August 7, 1996 - A violation was issued "for the improper control of a posted
high radiation area entrance...This is a repeat problem involving a worker
sensitivity to plant rules and regulations." (See October 4-8, 1993, for a
related incident.) (Peter W. Eselgroth, NRC, Chief Projects Branch No. 7,
Division or Reactor Projects, November 14, 1996.)
August 18, 1997 - "A contractor supervisor [Raytheon Nuclear] at GPU Nuclear
Corp.'s Three Mile Island (TMI) tested positive for a controlled substance
last week and was escorted from the site." ("Inside NRC"). (See February 19,
March 7 and 12 and June 15, 1987; July 19 and 30, 1991; and, July 29 and
August 29, 1992, for related incidents.)
September 13, 1996 - SALP grades plummeted to a "2" in Engineering and Plant
Support for the period of February 19, 1995 through August 3, 1996.
September 13, 1996 - A Notice of Violation was issued relating to problems in
TMI's Motor-Operated Valve Program: "...the program has remained substantially
incomplete 18 months later, with several fundamental weaknesses, ineffective
oversight, and an apparent lack of ownership." (NRC, Peter W. Eselgroth,
Chief, Projects Branch No. 7, Division of Reactor Projects.) (See February 23,
August 30 and September 9, 1994; and, August 17, 1995 for related
incidents.) (See February 26, 1998 for follow-up reprimand.)
September 29, 1996 - A NOV was issued when "...a scaffold was tied-off and
supported by a safety related pipe support for the nuclear river water system
without prior engineering evaluation and approval" (IR/NOV 50-289/96-07. ) See
November 5 and December 6, 1996, for related incidents.)
October 1, 1996 - The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) fined Thermal
Science, Inc. (TSI) $900,000 for "deliberately providing inaccurate or
incomplete information to the NRC concerning TSI's fire endurance and capacity
testing programs." (James Lieberman, Director of Enforcement.) The fine was
the largest assessed against a nuclear contractor and the second highest in
the agency's history. In 1992, the NRC declared TSI's fire barrier, Thermo-
Lag, "inoperable." (For a related incident, see September 29, 1994 and ¥ May
29 and October 23, 1998.)
October 29, 1996 - [See March 11, 1996 for background.] "We disagree with part
of your response to the second violation in which you suggest that the use of
engineering judgment to evaluate non-conforming conditions, in lieu of specific
ASME code requirements, is acceptable and within the guidance of ASME Section
XI...We disagree with that position." (James T. Wiggins, NRC, Director,
Division of Reactor Safety.) (Also, see September 9, 1995 for a related
event.)
November 1996 - The Allegheny Electric Cooperative filed suit with the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission against GPU Energy. (See May 22, 1997.)
November 5, 1996 - A NOV was issued when " a scaffold was used to lift the
motor of valve MU-V-14A, inside the protected area, before the operations
department reviewed and approved that the scaffold's final installation would
not endanger emergency safeguards equipment." (IR/NOV 50-289/96-07.) (See
September 29 and December 6, 1996, for related incidents.)
November 7, 1996 - Inservice Test Program (IR 96-08):
"We understand that you have committed to add to your IST program the 28 ASME
Class 2 and 3 relief valves and the four decay heat removal pump casing vent
valves listed in this report, as well as to reconsider formalized treatment of
this finding within the corrective action program. We consider the exclusion
of the 32 valves in question, in numerous safety related systems, to have
regulatory significance." (A. Randolph Blough, NRC, Deputy Director, Division
of Reactor Safety.) (See February 26, 1998 for a follow-up reprimand.) (Also,
see October 31, 1995, for a related incident.)
December 6, 1996 - A Notice of Violation was issued for scaffold related
incidents on September 29 and November 5, 1996.
January 22, 1997 - "The quality of corrective actions [emergency core
cooling systems] identified in event or near miss capture forms, as well as
tracking of the actions, was reviewed. We found that the quality varied by
department and that improvement is needed in the engineering area." (Peter W.
Eselgroth, NRC, Chief Projects Branch No. 7. Division of Reactor Projects.)
March 4, 1997 - The NRC "determined that numerous safety related components
were improperly downgraded from the 'nuclear safety related' classification to
a lower tier classification without appropriate safety evaluations or other
supporting engineering documentation...Moreover, we are concerned about the
poor implementation of the component classification process, as well as
related weaknesses in procedure adherence and communications. We are also
concerned about the ineffective oversight of the process by management,
especially related to not taking prompt action to evaluate and resolve program
problems identified by your own quality assurance activities. Because of the
considerable extent of the process weaknesses, we also question the broader
implications of these problems for other engineering processes." (NRC, Hubert
J. Miller, Regional Administrator.) (See March 20 and October 10, 1997, for
data relating to the $50,000 fine levied by the NRC against GPU Nuclear.)
March 12, 1997 - During an emergency preparedness exercise, "the NRC

inspection team identified four exercise weaknesses, as follows: 1) the emergency
response organization (ERO) failed to recognize a General Emergency when
warranted by plant conditions; 2) the ERO staff incorrectly evaluated steam
generator tube leakage; 3) the technical analysis of simulated accident
conditions provided to ERO managers by the Technical Support Staff Center was
inadequate; and 4) the Emergency Operations Facility staff did not initiate
protective action recommendations to off site officials for residents outside
of the 10-mile emergency planning zone when dose projections appeared to
indicate that protective action guidelines would be exceeded. During the post-
exercise critique, your organization identified several significant problems,
but did not identify weaknesses 2 & 4 above. Additionally, it appeared us that
your critique emphasized the impact of the simulation and procedural
deficiencies rather than the identified problems...the NRC views the
identified weaknesses and problems as important findings, requiring prompt
corrective action."
(NRC, Hubert J. Miller, Regional Administrator.) (See April, 24 and June 27,
1997 for related information, and October 10, 1997 for data relating to the
$55,000 fine.)
March 20, 1997 - "An inspection of your quality classification list and
component downgrade program determined that your implementation of the
component classification process was poor." (NRC, Charles W. Hehl, Director,
Division of Reactor Projects.) (See March 20 and October 19, 1997 for
background information and data relating to the $50,000 fine.) (Also, see
February 26, 1998 for follow-up reprimand.)
"Between June 1, 1992, and March 2, 1997, GPUN did not correctly identify
deficiencies in the supporting documentation for the safety classification of
components to preclude repetition of problems with insufficient documentation
in support of QCL activities." (IR 50-289/98-08.)
April 25, 1997 - "Based on review of findings (unresolved items)
reference 1, we have identified seven apparent violations associated with
Technical Specifications...A pre-decisional enforcement conference to discuss
these apparent violations has been scheduled for May 22, 1997...."
(1) design control weaknesses in the performance of calculations and in the
control of calculations used in the analysis for switch over to decay heat
removal system (DHRS) pump suction from the borated water storage tank (BWST)
to the reactor building sump under post-accident conditions;
(2) calculations that were being performed in documents, such as memoranda,
technical data reports, and plant engineering evaluation requests, that do not
comply with your engineering procedures for calculations;
(3) non-conservative assumptions and missing inputs in calculations for the
makeup pumps and makeup tank;
(4) a potential un-reviewed safety question when evaluating a Fin 4al Safety
Analysis Report (FSAR) change regarding the net positive suction head of the
DHRS pumps; and
(5) untimely and ineffective actions relative to dispositioning of licensee
identified deficiencies associated with the Quality Classification List. [See
February 26, 1998 for follow-up reprimand.]
(NRC, Charles W. Hehl, Director, Division of Reactor Project.) (See October
10, 1997 for information relating to the $210, 000 fine assessed against GPU
Nuclear.)
April 24, 1997 - "During the inspection, [Emergency Preparedness Exercise
March 5-7,1997] the NRC identified four exercise weaknesses: 1) the ERO failed
to recognize a General Emergency when warranted by plant conditions; 2) the
ERO staff incorrectly evaluated steam generator tube leakage; 3) the technical
analysis of simulated accident conditions provided to ERO managers by the
Technical Support Center staff was inadequate; and 4) the Emergency Operations
Facility staff did not assess, and discuss with off site officials, the need
for protective action recommendations for residents outside of the 10-mile
emergency planning zone when dose projections
appeared to indicate that protective action guidelines would be exceeded,
Additionally, we were unable to evaluate your actions to correct a radiation
dose assessment weakness from the April, 1995 full-participation exercise due
to similar malfunctions and controller actions which resulted in incorrect
radiological data being provided to the field monitoring teams...
These findings represent a significant degradation in performance since the
last full-participation exercise."
(NRC, James T. Wiggins, Director, Division of Reactor Safety.) (See October
10, 1997 for information relating to the $55,000 fine. Also, background
information can be found on March 12, April 24 and June 27, 1997.)
May 22, 1997 - PUC Chairman John M. Quain has been selected to mediate a
dispute filed by the Allegheny Electric Cooperative (AEC) with the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission against GPU Energy (GPU). In November 1996 the
AEC charged GPU "was providing 'abysmally bad' service, including cutting back
maintenance in rural areas, because it needed to save money in a soon-to-be
competitive environment and saw the rural electric co-ops as future
competition for the same customers." ("The Patriot News", May 22, 1997 B9.)
May 29, 1997 - Two apparent violations were identified by the NRC during an
inspection on April 27, 1997. "First, your staff identified that during
the period of about March 17, 1986 until March 23, 1997, there was no
reasonable assurance that the reactor building emergency cooling fans, AH-
E-1A, 1B, & 1C would have functioned under post-LOCA environment conditions
because their motors were not environmentally qualified. There was a small
length of exposed metal between the heat shrink tubing and the spark plug
porcelain connector to the motor. In addition, the inspectors concluded that
your process for and the timeliness of addressing corrective actions of the
condition of AH-E-1B & 1C upon identifying the condition of AH-E-1A was weak."
June 1997 - "Some utilities, GPU included, are looking outside the federal
government to address the problem [spent nuclear fuel]. last December 10.
nuclear electric utilities entered into discussions with the Skull Valley
Goshutes Indian tribe in Utah to establish a private fuel storage facility on
tribal grounds.
Under the proposal , the spent fuel from the 10 utilities would be placed in
steel canisters and then in reinforced concrete casks. the facility would be
used only until the federal repository begins operations. The project time
line calls for the NRC licensee fueling this summer with final approvals and
construction beginning in three to five years." GPU Nuclear Perspectives,
Information for Opinion Leaders Around the Three Mile Island Nuclear Station.
( See December 1994 for a related incident.)
June 21, 1997 - Due to the loss of off site power caused by the failure of
electrical problems with two damaged substation generator breakers, TMI was
forced to shut down for eight days. (See August 19, 1997, for the NRC's
follow-up evaluation.)
June 27, 1997 - Remediation of the four weaknesses displayed during the March
[Emergency preparedness] exercise was adequately demonstrated during this
exercise...However, two of those weaknesses (i.e., the failure to recognize a
General Emergency condition, and the failure to assess the need for a
protective action recommendation (PAR) outside of 10 miles) are apparent
violations which remain open, pending consideration of escalated enforcement
action ..." (James T. Wiggins, NRC, Director, Division of Reactor Safety.)
(See August 19, 1997, for the NRC's follow-up evaluation and October 10, 1997
for the $55,000 fine. Additional background data can be found on March 12,
1997.)
July 3, 1997 - GPU requested, and was granted permission, to be exempted from
criticality monitors for special nuclear materials. "The Commission['s]
technical staff has reviewed the licensee's submittal and has determined
that inadvertent criticality is not likely to occur in special nuclear
materials handling or storage areas at TMI-1. The quantity of special nuclear
material other than fuel that is stored on site is small enough to preclude
achieving a critical mass." (Federal Register, July 11, 1997, Volume 62,
Number 133, pp. 37317-37318.)
July 23, 1997 - During an NRC inspection of the motor-operated valve program,
a Notice of Violation was identified.
July 28, 1997 - GPU "declared the 'B' train of low pressure injection and
building spray inoperable because these systems are affected by the transfer
from the borated water storage tank to the reactor building sump. This places
the unit in a 72-hour technical specification limiting condition for
operation." [Event date: July 25, 1997.] (NRC Region I, IHQ OPS Officer, Leigh
Trocine.)
August 19, 1997 - "The [NRC] inspector noted that your staff had planned to
determine the cause of unbalanced current condition observed in the se
breakers by a substation technician prior to the LOOP [loss of off site power]
event on June 21, 1997. Even though your staff had planned to troubleshoot the
condition, this issue was not properly documented per your corrective action
process and plant management was not made aware of this anomaly prior to the
LOOP event. Therefore, we are considering this an unresolved open item until
our final review is done." Peter W. Eselgroth, NRC, Chief of Projects Branch
No. 7, Division of Reactor Projects.)
October 4, 1997 - "...upon raising of the [reactor vessel head] seal plate
numerous hot particles were discovered by the RCT [Rad Con Technician.] " The
NRC issued a Notice of Violation. [NRC 50-289/97-09 (EA 97-533) ].
(See February 26, 1998 for follow-up SAL P information.)
October 10, 1997 - The NRC fined GPU Nuclear $210,000 for four violations at
TMI-1 including: $50,000 for inadequate design controls, including the use of
incorrect numbers for calculations and inadequate verification of safety
evaluations [See April 25, 1997, (1) through (4) for more information];
$50,000 for improperly downgrading some safety-related equipment without
providing proper evaluations or documentation {See March 4, 1997 for
background data]; $55,000 for failing to address outstanding problems in a
timely fashion [See April 25, 1997, (5) for more documentation] ; and, $55,000
for the flawed emergency training exercise held on March 5, 1996 [See June 27
and August 19, 1997 for related information]. ("The Patriot News", October 1
Ì0, 1997.)
October 15, 1997 - GPU failed to implement operating procedures during the
filling and venting of the reactor coolant system (RCS). "Consequently,
approximately 50 gallons of RCS water overflowed out of the CRDM [control rod
drive mechanism] vents onto the reactor vessel head area." (NRC 50-289/97-09
[EA 97-433 & 50-289/97-10).
The NRC issued a Notice of Violation.
November 20, 1997 - The NRC issued a Notice of Violation when GPU failed to
"review and approve a substantive change to an existing inservice test (IST)
surveillance procedure 1300-3K, "IST of Reactor River Water Pumps and Valves,"
before the closure of the reactor building emergency cooler inlet and outlet
valves to conduct a leak test. The IST procedure was written and approved to
determine the cooler and inlet and outlet open and closed times, but did not
allow the valves to be closed for the seven hour leak rate test." (NRC
50-289/97-09 [EA 97-433 & 50/289/97-10).
December 19, 1997 - The NRC launched an investigation at TMI-1 trying to
identify why GPU failed to detect that the pressure [operated]-relive valve
[the same valve that failed at Unit-2 and caused the March 1979 nuclear
accident] was inoperable for two years:
"... the regulatory agency [NRC] said the findings are serious enough to
warrant a Monday [December 22, 1997] meeting in the NRC's suburban
Philadelphia offices to determine why they occurred [four maintenance related
problems under NRC review.]"
"In the recent past, we have a seen a number of areas that we are concerned
about, and we are going to bring them in on Monday to find out more about it,
" said NRC spokesman Neil A. Sheehan. "As far as public health and safety, we
believe the public was protected."
"These problems mostly reflect personnel error, carelessness on the part of
their work staff," Sheehan said. ("Patriot News", December 19, 1997, B) (See
Executive Summary for numerous related incidents listed under "Housekeeping

Flaws.")[At GPUN's other nuclear power plant, Oyster Creek, the NRC cited the

Company for six violations of NRC code and Hubert Miller, Regional Administrator,
stated that the problems were "repetitive violations caused by human error.
Miller added, "[They were] part of a larger trend of human errors at Oyster
Creek."
The violations included performing electrical repairs without notifying the
control room supervisor and sending soil contaminated by low-level
radioactivity to a local landfill.]
January 27, 1998 - A Violation was issued for a problem identified by the NRC
in IR 97-09. The PORV was inoperable "due to being mis-wired and failure to
perform post-maintenance test(s) following replacement during 11R refueling
outage. (See October 31, 1995, for an incident involving the PORV.)
February 18, 1998 - A missing Thermo-Lag barrier was identified. (LER
98-003-00; March 19, 1998.) (See May 29 & (October 23, 1998, for related
incidents.)
February 26, 1998 - During the SALP 1 evaluation period (August 5, 1996-
January 24, 1998), the NRC observed:
"...performance declined in the engineering area; the second consecutive
assessment in which a decline was noted, indicating that previous efforts
to improve performance in that area was not effective...on occasion the
operators did not rigorously follow approved procedures, the most
noteworthy example resulted in a reactor coolant system
overfill....Significant problems were identified in many engineering program
areas. Examples included problems with Inservice Testing (IST), the Motor
Operated Relief Valve (MOV) programs, the Quality Classification List (QCL)
Process, and technical support. Adverse findings associated with engineering
performance, which were identified by oversight groups, were not
effectively addressed until eventually found by the NRC...Overall
performance in the radiation protection area was good, though there were
some problems in the controls of hot particles, and posting and
monitoring of areas within the radiologically controlled area...Some
significant problems were identified during the March 1997 emergency drill,
which required a remedial drill be conducted. These performance problems
highlighted ineffective management in the emergency preparedness
area.(Hubert J. Miller, NRC, Regional Administrator, February 26, 1998.)
February 26, 1998 - "...in numerous instances your organization has not taken
appropriate and timely action to correct known adverse conditions. Engineering
work backlog to resolve issues continues to grow as you have not established
an effective corrective action tracking and resource planning process. Further
senior management attention to manage the existing corrective action backlog
and to address long-standing engineering issues is warranted...
" Based on the results of this inspection, the NRC has determined that a
violation of NRC requirements has occurred...This violation is of concern
because this is -a second example where plant operators used a procedure
that did not meet the intent of the activity performed. Specifically, the
inspectors identified a failure of your operations staff to employ a reviewed
and approved procedure to perform a troubleshooting leak check of the reactor
building emergency coolers." (NRC Integrated IR 50-289/97-10 & 50-320/97-03 &
Notice of Violation.)
April 9, 1998 - "Following self-identification of a minor non-safety
significant missed technical specification sampling requirement on the spent
fuel pool, your staff focused too narrowly on the root cause as documented in
LER 98-002." [Missed Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) Sample Following a Water Addition.
{Section E8.1} (IR 50-289/98-01.)
May 29, 1998 - "In an order confirming GPU Nuclear Inc.'s commitment to
replace Thermo-Lag fire barrier material, federal officials yesterday notified
the utility that its efforts may not be enough to complete the work on time
[December 31, 1999] an d, therefore, may not meet regulatory requirements
for licensing." (See also March 19,
1987; March 6, 1988; June 12 and September 1 and 3, 1991; July 27 and November
23, 1992; August 11 and September 30, 1993; and, September 29, 1994; October
1, 1996, and, February 18 & October 23, 1998.)
August 25, 1998 - GPUN "identified a situation where operation with a single
offsite power source, and an ES [emergency safeguard] actuation could cause a
complete a loss of offsite power (LOOP) to the safety related 4 KV buses. The
cause of this issue was previously incorrect assumptions for the impedance of
the bus duct between the auxiliary transformers and the 4 KV safety related
buses." (IR 50-289/98-05) (See September 16, 1998 for a related incident.)
September 4, 1998 - "We [the NRC] are concerned by your poor control over the
documented accident analysis for a loss of feedwater accident and apparent
inadequacies in the safety evaluation review of a design basis calculation
allowing a reduction in the emergency feedwater flow rate following such
an accident. While there does not appear to be an operability problem, these
issues raise continuing concern regarding your calculation review process and
sensitivity toward the maintenance of the design basis for safety related
systems." (IR 50-289/98-03.)
September 16, 1998 - GPUN "identified a situation where a loss of one offsite
power source, with the unit operating at 100% power with assumed maximum
balance of plant electrical loading and minimum expected offsite grid
voltage, could result in a complete LOOP [loss of on site power] to the safety
related 4 KV buses. (IR-50-289/98-05.) (See August 25, 1998 for a related
incident.)
September 30, 1998 -The NRC evaluated the emergency preparedness drill: "A
notable deficiency was the failure to complete the necessary off-site agency
notifications within the required fifteen minutes after both of the drill
event declarations. This deficiency is being classified as an exercise
weakness requiring corrective action." (IR 50-289/98-07.)
October 2, 1998 -The NRC "identified a weakness" in GPU's "actions to correct
known deficiencies in the calibration of the makeup tank level instruments,
that existed between May 1997 and August 1998. These deficiencies included an
improper assessment of makeup tank e operability, problems with the tracking
of open commitments to correct known deficiencies, and the failure to
implement calibrations in a timely manner following setpoint calculation
changes. The NRC identified this "weakness" as an "apparent violation." Peter
W. Eselgroth, Chief, NRC, Projects Branch No. 7, Division of Reactor Projects.
October 15, 1998 - The NRC identified a violation relating to a change GPUN
"made to the makeup system cross-connect valves..." (IR 50-289/98-06). James
T. Wiggins, NRC, Director, Division of Reactor Safety.
October 19, 1998 - The NRC observed a failed feedwater heater relief valve
October 23, 1998 - GPUN discovered 11 incidents dating back to 1987 where
Thermo-Lag was improperly installed. "More cases may be discovered as the
replacement work continues, NRC officials said." ("Patriot News", October 23,
1998, B1).
(See February 11 & May 29, 1998, to track problems associated with Thermo-
Lag.)
October 28, 1998 - A potential violation was identified by NRC inspectors
relating to "the potential for bypass of the suppression pool. This issue is
a violation of NRC requirements, which could be considered for escalated
enforcement and be subject to a civil penalty." The NRC declined to "exercise
discretion" and cite GPU for a violation or mandate a civil penalty. (Charles
W. Hehl, NRC, Director, Division of Reactor Projects.)
December 6, 1998 - An NRC inspector found an emergency diesel generator valve
out of position. (IR 50-289/98-06.)
December 16, 1998 - The NRC noted observed "an unexpected increase in the
reactor coolant drain tank (RCDT) and a decrease in makeup tank (MUT) level
during work on a reactor coolant pump (RCP) seal leak off flow transmitter in
the reactor building (RB)."
(IR 50-289/98-08.)