The Commando Threat
at Nuclear Power Plants

During the 1990s, nearly half (46%) of security drills were failed by U.S. nuclear power plants. This NRC program was called the Operational Safeguards Response Evaluation. The exercises tested the capabilities of plant security to successfully repel an adversary whose objective is radiological sabotage. The drill pit one or more mock terrorists against the plant security guards. The mock terrorists attempt to simulate destroying the plant's vital systems to cause a core meltdown and breach of containment. In some cases plants failed despite increasing security forces by 80% and specially trained for six weeks. The guard force was then reduced to normal levels afterwards. A lone mock terrorist was able to simulate causing a meltdown a one plant! Current NRC security regulations only assume attackers enter from a single point. A successful commando attack can occur in less than 90 seconds. Locked reactor building doors represent only a 15 second delay to attackers carrying satchel charges. Peach Bottom holds the record for the shortest time in which a simulated attack has breached the perimeter fence and access control area. The entry took only 17 seconds. Rather than fix the security problems, the NRC chose to eliminate the OSRE program in 1998. Media exposure and public pressure caused the White House to order the NRC to reinstate the program. But, the "force on force" drills were suspended after the 9-11 attacks until once again reinstated at a few plants in 2003. See video of an OSRE drill. Windows Media Real One Quicktime Modern hand-carried weapons give commandos a decided advantage over plant security forces. A March 11, 2003 prison escape in France shocked law enforcement because of the heavy weaponry employed by the intruders. Commandos carried satchel charges, rocket propelled grenades, automatic weapons and a fake bazooka. The attackers blew holes in walls, blew open metal gates, set fires to hinder responders and sprayed guard towers with automatic gunfire. "We are confronted with a new type of escape which we simply haven't experienced until now, military-type operations using real weapons of war, and carried out by people prepared to take maximum risks." French Justice Minister Dominique Perben Alliance, a prison workers union, condemned a "new type of commando whose members no longer hesitate to use 'weapons of war' to attack our institutions." AFP (Agence France-Presse) 3-12-03 The current guard response to intrusions relies upon defensive strategies rather than apprehension of then intruders. It took nearly four hours to find and apprehend the TMI intruder. In 1993, TMIA's Scott Portzline presented testimony to the U.S. Senate and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission on the use of public records to plan a nuclear plant attack. Up until then, the NRC stated that people would have a hard time knowing there way around let alone knowing how to cause a meltdown. The NRC has dropped that arguement. Using publicly available records one can: Develop a fool-proof plan which could, with relative ease, overwhelm a security force and cause irreversible and catastrophic damage. Determine size and strength of the security force Where the force is likely to be posted Methods of gaining access to plants and buildings Sabotage targets and priorities Technological designs to prevent sabotage (some make sabotage easier) Sabotage tools and devices Methods of disrupting communications Guards are overworked, under-paid, under-equipped and sometimes found asleep on the job. Security guards have attempted or committed suicide at several plants. Supervisors and trainers are known to falsify shooting score results or even shoot into targets for guards who can't qualify on his own. Guard Fired A security guard employed by the Wackenhut Corporation at the Indian Point Nuclear plant near New York City (Wackenhut also guards TMI) was fired when he was asked to work his sixth straight day of 12 hour shifts. The guard stated to Wackenhut in writing that it would be "physically and mentally exhausting," that he was fully aware of his condition, and that he "would not want to be negligent in performing [his] duties as a security officer." Three Mile Island Alert's Recommendations The NRC must triple the number of guards currently protecting our nuclear plants Guards must be better trained Guards must not be compelled to work excessive overtime Guards must receive better pay Guards must have heavy weapons to match intruders firepower Guards must be deployed in multiple layers Some guards must be dedicated to apprehending intruders Guards must patrol the owner controlled area The use of deadly force needs be legally authorized in a clear manner for more information see these links: Indian Point Guard Foster Zeh interview on ABC Good Morning America Project On Government Oversight Nuclear Power Plant Security: Voices from Inside the Fences This page updated by Three Mile Island Alert January 2004