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Decommissioning The Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Plant
An Analysis Of Vermont Yankee's Decommissioning Fund
And Its Projected Decommissioning Costs

Summary:

Fairewinds Associates, Inc reviewed the Decommissioning Fund reports and associated documents submitted by Energy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, LLC to the Vermont Public Service Board (PSB). The reports and data submitted for review by the State of Vermont clearly show that *Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee* [herein simply referred to as Entergy] *has made a series of non-conservative assumptions concerning the decommissioning of Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Plant and its Decommissioning Fund.* Moreover, we (Fairewinds Associates, Inc) opine that *Entergy's non-conservative assumptions*, which are clearly delineated in their submittal to the PSB, *may shift both the risk and burden of financing Vermont Yankee's actual dismantlement to the State of Vermont and future generations of Vermonters.*

After reviewing all the evidence, Fairewinds Associates, Inc, opines that if Vermont Yankee were to shut down in either 2008 or 2012, the State of Vermont, its taxpayers, and its ratepayers may be faced with two equally bleak alternatives. The data supplied by Entergy indicates that the Decommissioning Fund does not contain adequate funds to dismantle Vermont Yankee after a permanent shutdown in either 2008 or 2012. Since Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee is a Limited Liability Corporation (LLC) and not a public utility, Entergy, VY's parent company may:

- Declare bankruptcy and leave the cleanup of the reactor and storage of spent nuclear fuel to the State of Vermont and its ratepayers, OR
- Delay the environmental cleanup for decades leaving this extremely toxic radioactive material stored on the banks of the Connecticut River until interest in

the Decommissioning Fund has accumulated to the point that this LLC can even afford to pay for a complete dismantlement.

In reviewing the data supplied by Entergy, and discovering that the heralded Decommissioning Fund has insufficient moneys to completely dismantle Vermont Yankee after its designed 2012 shutdown, it is evident that the energy produced by Vermont Yankee has never been the money saver touted by Entergy and its proponents. The reality is that as Vermont Yankee ages, Vermont (the State Government, the taxpayers and the ratepayers) will continue to incur huge expenses and a significant liability while the LLC that owns Vermont Yankee sends hundreds of millions of dollars in profit to its out-of-state parent corporation Entergy Nuclear.

It may still be possible to avoid bankruptcy and decommission Vermont Yankee in a timely fashion after a 2012 permanent shutdown by significantly increasing the money in the Decommissioning Fund. Please see the section at the end of this document entitled: Questions Regarding Possible Methods for Increasing the Decommissioning Fund to Minimum Levels.

Reference Materials used:

All calculations and figures generated were drawn from Entergy's own numbers. The documents reviewed and used to make these assessments are public documents that were submitted by Energy to the Vermont Public Service Board in August 2007 as part of the required filing for VY's certificate of public good. Members of and consultants to Fairewinds Associates, Inc reviewed the following specific documents relating to the Cost of Decommissioning Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Plant:

- Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station Post Shutdown Decommissioning Activities Report (VYNPS PSDAR) Pursuant to Docket No. 6545 Sale Order August 7, 2007, and Primmer, Piper, Eggleston & Cramer Cover Letter to the Vermont Public Service Board regarding this late Compliance Filing --- herein called VYNPS PSDAR.
- Downs, Rachlin, Martin PLLC Compliance Letter to the Vermont Public Service Board regarding the status of the Vermont Yankee Decommissioning Fund [Condition No. 8 of the Certificate of Public Good] dated: January 10, 2007.

- Decommissioning Cost Analysis for the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Plant prepared by TLG Services, Inc. January 2007 (Document E11-1559-002, Rev. 0) ---- herein called the TLG Report.

Analysis of Documents:

After reviewing the documents related to the Cost of Decommissioning Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Plant, we (Fairewinds Associates, Inc) make the following observations:

1. Background:

- 1.1. Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee (ENVY) is a Limited Liability Corporation (LLC). As such, its assets and liabilities are limited to the power plant and the land it sits upon and do not include any of the assets of its corporate parent Entergy.
- 1.2. Vermont Yankee is an extremely old nuclear power plant, which has recently undergone one of the largest increases in power production (named an uprate by the nuclear industry) in the country.
- 1.3. Vermont has a very small population, and therefore neither its taxpayers nor its ratepayers can afford to make up the anticipated financial shortfall in Vermont Yankee's Decommissioning Fund.
- 1.4. Furthermore, should Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee LLC, fail to complete its fiduciary obligations to completely decommission Vermont Yankee (VY) in a timely fashion, there would be no corporate assets for the State of Vermont to attach and apply.
- 1.5. Finally, if the VY LLC declared bankruptcy prior to the completion of VY's decommissioning and dismantlement, the State of Vermont would be left with the remaining toxic albatross as well as its significant financial liability.

2. Decommissioning Estimates:

- 2.1. The actual decommissioning estimate, produced by TLG Services, is a one-size fits all approach. While this approach is routinely applied throughout the industry, it can be quite problematic for utilities and ratepayers because it does not apply site-specific variables. In this case, we believe this is quite detrimental to an accurate assessment of the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Plant Site, thereby placing a huge burden upon all Vermonters.
- 2.2. A recent report from England highlights the uncertainty associated with generic,

one size fits all decommissioning estimates.

2.2.1. In less than one year, the cost estimate for decommissioning Britain's nuclear reactors skyrocketed by sixteen percent.

2.2.2. The reason, according to the October 11, 2007 edition of The Guardian, was that detailed site-specific decommissioning estimates replaced the generic models.

"The official cost of cleaning up 20 of Britain's nuclear facilities will be more than £73bn, 16% higher than estimated last year, according to the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority yesterday.... The NDA blamed the soaring cost estimates for clean-up on obtaining more detailed estimates for dismantling buildings and clearing sites from individual operators managing locations such as Sellafield in Cumbria for the state-owned agency."

2.3. For an example of site-specific problems, let's look at the decommissioning and dismantling of the Connecticut Yankee Nuclear Power Plant, which was located on the Connecticut River in Haddam, Connecticut.

2.3.1. The Utilities that owned Connecticut Yankee had originally set aside a Decommissioning Fund of \$410 Million for decommissioning Connecticut Yankee, a process that began in 1998. (*Hartford Current, November 12, 2005* <http://www.courant.com/news/local/hc-cynukemess.artnov12,0,6222764.story?col l=hc-headlines-home>)

2.3.2. The cost of decommissioning CY climbed to more than \$831 Million due to Strontium 90 (Sr 90) that had contaminated the water table surrounding the plant and was discovered well after the decommissioning process began.

- Sr 90, with a 29-year half-life, remains in the environment for 300 years.
- It is entirely manmade, and is a "bone seeker" in the human body.
- Obviously, the extreme problems at Connecticut Yankee were not reflected in the "generic" estimate, as they were unknown to the owners prior to shutdown.
- These incredible costs have been passed on to Connecticut's ratepayers, even though Connecticut Yankee's parent companies made considerable profit during its operational years.

2.4. On the other hand, let's look closer to home and specifically at Vermont Yankee.

Notably, the area between the Vermont Yankee cooling towers is acknowledged by Entergy to be radiologically contaminated. While in comparison to Connecticut Yankee, this is a significantly less extreme example, it is a good one to use specifically because it is site specific to Vermont Yankee.

- 2.4.1. When we reviewed the reports delineated above, we were unable to find any place within the TLG report or in the VYNPS PSDAR where that known cost of additional contamination cleanup has been added to the entire decommissioning plan.
- 2.4.2. Without a clear individualized site assessment, it is our opinion that Vermonters may be stuck with huge unrecoverable cost overruns in the same manner that the ratepayers at CY were forced by the courts to absorb those \$400 Million decommissioning cost overruns.
- 2.5. Viewed in comparison to the huge cost overruns of decommissioning Connecticut Yankee, and since we already know that the generic one-sized approach can not be applied to Vermont Yankee due to its radiologically contaminated land between the cooling towers, we believe it would behoove the State to insist that an individualized site assessment and plan be created.
- 2.6. Finally, please note that TLG, the company that prepared the estimate, is a wholly owned subsidiary of Entergy. Consequently, it is also our opinion that an independent firm or a special task force comprised of independent nuclear engineers well-versed in decommissioning should be used to create or to review and critique Vermont Yankee's Individualized Decommissioning Plan prior to its acceptance by the Vermont State Legislature.

3. Exposure Rates

- 3.1. The generic TLG study appears to assume dose rate of 25 mrem after the site is remediated [entirely cleaned when VY is dismantled], even though the State of Vermont's present site boundary radiation dose limit is only 20 mrem.
- 3.2. It also appears that the Vermont State limit of 20 mrem has not been factored into the TLG cost estimate, thus just meeting the present State limit of 20 mrem will increase the cost of waste disposal.
- 3.3. Furthermore the Vermont State legislature may wish to set a different dose rate for site remediation as both Maine and Massachusetts have already done.
 - 3.3.1. Maine and Massachusetts have site release dose rates of only 10 mrem.

- 3.3.2. NY State has a 10-mrem "guidance" law currently in review.
- 3.3.3. New Jersey has determined its site release rate to be 15 mrem.
- 3.4. These lower remediated site release dose rates mean that there is cleaner site for eventual public use, but it also drives up the costs because more radioactive waste is shipped off site.
4. More specifically, we have **four major areas of concern**:
 - 4.1. Our **First Concern** is that we were *unable to find any location within the report that specifically addresses the increased cost of decommissioning due to the power uprate at Vermont Yankee*.
 - 4.1.1. In his testimony to the Vermont Public Service Board (PSB) in 2004, Arnold Gundersen noted that there would be approximately a 4% (four percent) increase in the cost of decommissioning due to VY's power uprate. Neither DPS (Department of Public Service) nor Entergy disputed Mr. Gundersen's cost estimate.
 - 4.1.2. Four percent is a very significant number as it would increase the extra financial burden of decommissioning due to uprate by at least an additional \$30 Million depending upon the which actual decommissioning plan is chosen.
 - 4.1.3. An uprate definitely generates additional nuclear fuel, which necessitates increased fuel storage and in addition also produces more radioactive waste products, some of which are deposited throughout all the plant's systems in what the nuclear industry commonly calls CRUD (Chalk River Unidentified Deposits).
 - 4.1.4. The additional fuel storage and the CRUD analysis and cleanup will add significant cost to the decommissioning process. We did not see any documents or tables that contained breakout values for either the incremental fuel storage or for the additional radioactivity deposited throughout the plant as a result of the uprate.
 - 4.1.5. Due to the uprate, VY has already been required to replace its old contaminated high-pressure steam turbine (now stored on site) with a new

turbine. The TLG analysis did not account for the extra disposal costs of the additional turbine.

- 4.1.6. Components near the reactor vessel itself become more radioactive through a process called activation. The TLG analysis did not take this additional activation radiation into account in the decommissioning assessment.
 - 4.1.7. Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee LLC has made millions of extra dollars in profit from this power uprate, for electricity sent out of state, and yet Entergy has not compensated the Decommissioning Fund and Vermont's ratepayers and taxpayers for the extra burden and extra risk involved in having Vermont Yankee produce 20 percent more power than it was designed to produce when it was designed during the 1960's.
 - 4.1.8. The TLG analysis estimates that it will cost approximately \$4.5 Million per year for almost twenty years to store and monitor spent nuclear fuel on site until 2043. A significant portion of this \$4.5 Million per year cost estimate is for the spent fuel (used up and highly radioactive fuel) that was solely generated as a result of the uprate. Entergy has made no attempt to separate these considerable additional uprate related fuel storage costs, and instead have simply added them to the burden already borne by Vermont's ratepayers.
 - 4.1.9. In summary of Issue 1 – the increased costs of decommissioning VY due to uprate – the spent fuel, activation of the vessel, more contaminated equipment and increased CRUD deposition due to the power uprate have not been taken into account in the TLG analysis and the Entergy plan, nor has the Vermont ratepayer been compensated for this extra financial burden.
- 4.2. The **Second Concern** we note is that *Entergy's analysis alleges that the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Plant will generate less than 1/2 the amount of waste that the standard approved nuclear industry computer code calculates for a generic decommissioning assessment.* The documentation of this issue may be viewed on Page 18 of the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station Post Shutdown Decommissioning Activities Report (VYNPS PSDAR) Pursuant to Docket No.

6545 Sale Order August 7, 2007.

- 4.2.1. Since the disposal of radioactive waste is one of the single biggest contributors to decommissioning costs, it is our opinion that this assumption is grossly non-conservative and inadequate.
 - 4.2.2. As noted previously, the land between Vermont Yankee's cooling towers has been acknowledged by the firm to be contaminated with radioactivity. The volume of this waste alone *will significantly distort* the mathematical assumption that Vermont Yankee has made that this nuclear power plant will generate only ½ (one-half) the radioactive waste that other similar plants will generate.
 - 4.2.3. Moreover, according to the Decommissioning cost analysis in Tables 3.1 and 3.2 on pages 21 and 22 (of 35 pages), burial costs are estimated to amount to be about \$98 Million. If this figure is only ½ (one-half) of what the industry standard code would have calculated, it represents approximately 15% of the total cost to decommission the entire plant. In general, the cost of disposing of nuclear decommissioning waste exceeds 20% of the total cost of decommissioning, and oftentimes these costs are much higher. (These figures do not include any costs associated with the highly radioactive spent fuel.)
 - 4.2.4. In review of the data provided by Entergy, it is evident that this generic one-size fits all assessment may be low by as much as \$100 Million Dollars due to the unique perspective that VY will generate only ½ the nuclear waste calculated by nuclear industry approved computer codes designed to apply specific costs and assumptions.
- 4.3. Our **Third Concern**, and of major concern, is the fact that there is no federal low-level waste repository to which to ship the dismantled and decommissioned parts of the plant. In the second to last paragraph on Page 8 of the VYNPS PSDAR, Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee acknowledges that there is no current national low-level waste repository in which to deposit the low-level waste. This issue is extremely problematic from a cost accounting standpoint for two reasons:

- 4.3.1. First, as the report notes, there is no place to ship the low level waste (not fuel).
- 4.3.1.1. In our opinion the lack of a low level waste repository could create the situation in which a cartel would dramatically increase the disposal costs far beyond that of this Decommissioning Fund to pay.
- 4.3.1.2. We believe that the lack of a low level waste repository is a national crisis in which many nuclear vendors and utilities will be searching for waste disposal sites thereby creating a situation in which the costs may be easily manipulated by the waste-site owners and their managers, or cash-strapped governments who take on the challenge of waste disposal in exchange for significant amounts money due to the extreme environmental and health hazards of long-term low level waste storage. This implies an upward pressure on the cost of waste storage.
- 4.3.2. Second, and in our opinion more of a concern, is that given the trend in sighting new radioactive dumps, it is most likely that there will not even be a location for Vermont Yankee to ship its waste. This means that the waste will remain in Vermont in perpetuity.
- 4.3.2.1. The fact that the nuclear waste may permanently remain within each state is a policy decision the NRC is supposedly currently considering, and which, to our knowledge, the Vermont Legislature has not been made aware and has not discussed.
- 4.3.3. Additionally, in our opinion, the longer Vermont Yankee remains in operation the less likely there will be a waste repository available for VY to ship its waste. Demand for waste storage is increasing and supply is shrinking, impacting both availability and cost.
- 4.4. Finally, our **Fourth Concern** is also our single most important issue. *At no point do the reports provided to the PSB analyze whether the cash flow from the Decommissioning Fund is adequate enough to support any of the decommissioning scenarios outlined within the report and its supporting documents.*

- 4.4.1. While the report is replete with cash flow analyses for the cost of numerous decommissioning alternatives, no comparison of the cash flow compared to the availability of funds for decommissioning was provided.
- 4.4.2. We note that the TLG cost estimates are in 2006 dollars and have not taken into account inflation.
- 4.4.3. Our calculations assume a maximum inflation rate of 2.5%, which, since it is lower than the fifty-year historical average is calculated in Entergy and Vermont Yankee's favor. [Please note that from 1956–2006 the average overall US inflation rate was 3.6 percent per year. Fairewinds Associates calculated this inflation rate from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, US Dept of Commerce: <http://bea.gov/national/xls/gdplev.xls>.]
- 4.4.4. Fairewinds Associates applied the end points for the period, and a constant-rate geometric growth for the fifty-year period to calculate the fifty-year inflation rate. [The assumption of 2.5 percent is conservative in favor of ENVY, and minimizes the impact of inflation without completely eliminating it.]
- 4.4.5. We reviewed and considered four decommissioning scenarios using data provided by TLG and Entergy. These four scenarios are:

- Table 1** – *Decommissioning Fund Bankruptcy projected for 2018*
2008 shutdown, decommissioning costs in 2006 dollars (no inflation applied)
- Table 2** – *Decommissioning Fund Bankruptcy projected for 2017*
2008 shutdown, decommissioning costs inflated at 2.5%
- Table 3** – *Decommissioning Fund Bankruptcy projected for 2020*
2012 shutdown, decommissioning costs inflated 1.5% (TLG Scenario 1)
- Table 4** – *Decommissioning Fund Bankruptcy projected for 2018*
2012 shutdown, decommissioning costs inflated at 2.5% (TLG Scenario 1)

5. **Key to Tables** – All four Tables were created using data provided by Entergy.
- 5.1. The lower bound 5.5% fund growth rate is an Entergy value (provided on page 2 of the January 10, 2007 Downs, Rachlin, Martin PLLC memo).
- 5.2. The upper bound 6.8% fund growth rate is also provided by Entergy and is

addressed in paragraph 2 in a certified memo signed on January 10, 2007 by Ted Sullivan, Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee site vice-president. [It is entitled Attachment 2 to the Downs Martin Rachlin PLLC letter we reviewed, and it was part of a submittal to the PSB.]

- 5.3. The report also alleges that the waste will be *left* on site until 2043, when it states that the last vestige of the plant will most likely be removed from the site, and those extensive costs will be covered by the Fund.
- 5.4. However, if Vermont Yankee receives a life extension, then the final removal of all waste is may be possible by 2082.
- 5.5. In our opinion, the calculations of the Fund's value at 5.5% (percent) show that the Decommissioning Fund will be bankrupt in 2020, leaving the State of Vermont with an uncovered liability of at least \$160 Million in 2043 when the last vestige of the plant will allegedly be removed from the site.
- 5.6. In conclusion, it is our opinion that the 5.5% and 6.8% fund growth rates bound bankruptcy of the Decommissioning Fund somewhere before 2020, most likely leaving the State with at least 23-years of deficit financing prior to permanent waste disposal in 2043.

Conclusion:

Moreover, we believe that the documents show that Entergy is clearly aware of this financial problem, even though they have not provided a formal analysis to the PSB.

For example, within Entergy's VYNPS PSDAR report, it is stated on pages 4 and 5 that Entergy would place Vermont Yankee in what it terms as SAFSTOR beyond March 2012, for a time period that would depend upon, among other things, “*the availability of funds sufficient to cover decommissioning expenses*, available storage for spent fuel, and adequate access to a low-level radioactive waste disposal facility”. Each of these factors will impact the cost of the safe-storage estimate as was described in more detail in the previous narrative and is summarized below:

“Decommissioning employing the SAFSTOR approach is required to be completed within sixty (60) years of permanent cessation of operations, although longer time periods may be considered when necessary to protect public health and safety. The safe-storage period evaluated in this report

defers decommissioning for a period of four (4) years, consistent with the four-year period of time between a 2008 Early Shutdown and expiration of VYNPS' current operating license in March 2012. This scenario is provided primarily for illustrative purposes, as Entergy VY currently anticipates maintaining VYNPS in SAFSTOR beyond March 2012, for a time period that would depend upon, among other things, availability of funds sufficient to cover decommissioning expenses, available storage for spent fuel, and adequate access to a low-level radioactive waste disposal facility. Each of these factors impacting the term of the safe-storage period is described in more detail..." (VYNPS PSDAR pages 4 & 5 of 20 -- *underlining added for emphasis*)

In our opinion this allegedly thorough report is rather disingenuous in that the option of dismantlement immediately after a 2012 shutdown (TLG Services Scenario #1) cannot in fact be supported by the available funds. Furthermore, Vermont Yankee has produced an incredible profit for Entergy. Not only was Vermont Yankee quite profitable prior to uprate, it has been incredibly profitable following uprate. The profit alone, following uprate, is almost \$100 Million Dollars per year according to Entergy's own documents [see footnote page 4 of Attachment 2]. Yet, Entergy has not accounted for the additional costs of uprate waste and disposal in its assessment. Why should Vermonters be responsible for storing and living next to nuclear waste for at least 60 more years and maybe forever, when the extreme profits from the uprate could more than adequately fund environmentally sound decommissioning soon after shutdown whether that is in 2012 or 2032 with life extension?

Entergy has created Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee as a Limited Liability Corporation with a severely underfunded Decommissioning Fund and non-conservative cost assumptions. In our opinion, Vermont Yankee continues to make an incredible profit at the expense of Vermont's taxpayers and ratepayers who will be left with the enormous burden of radioactive waste liabilities for generations and most likely in perpetuity. Why must Vermonters bear the burden of a Decommissioning Fund that is inadequate for decommissioning Vermont Yankee in a timely and expedited manner if the monies are even available to do a complete decommissioning, while Entergy profits well in excess of \$100 Million Dollars per year from the uprate alone?

Attachments 1, 2, 3, & 4 are Tables:

- Table 1** – *Decommissioning Fund Bankruptcy projected for 2018*
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- Table 4** – *Decommissioning Fund Bankruptcy projected for 2018*
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Attachment 5: Vermont Yankee - Engineering Department Memo MSD 2002/002, February 7, 2002 from Enrico Betti, Tom Marsteller, Joe Habich, Subject: Condenser Long Term Plan, File: UND2002-042 07 [electronic PDF entitled: one million per megawatt]

Questions Regarding Possible Methods for Increasing the Decommissioning Fund to Minimum Levels:

In our estimate, the Decommissioning Fund currently contains significantly less money than will be required to decommission Vermont Yankee, in the event that there are no catastrophic clean-up efforts to be undertaken. If there is a catastrophic issue, similar to the unknown Strontium 90 (Sr 90) contamination at Connecticut Yankee, the cost of decommissioning would be even more significant and cannot be estimated without a more thorough and independent review. In our opinion, the State and/or the Legislature may be able to explore the following areas:

- The Fund should not be the sole responsibility of Vermont's ratepayers, since other ratepayers use a significant portion of the power generated by Vermont Yankee. If those ratepayers are benefitting from electricity generated in Vermont, then they or Entergy itself should also be contributing toward that portion of the decommissioning costs. However, this question must be reviewed by an attorney well versed in energy law in order to assure that no legislatively assessed contribution to the Decommissioning Fund violates the Commerce Clause of the Constitution in regards to interstate commerce.
 - Did the State of Vermont make any special arrangements for additional Decommissioning Fund contributions in the 2002 contract with Entergy?
- In our opinion, Entergy itself should make up the shortfall due to the additional costs of decommissioning VY following the uprate. Currently the plan they have

presented to the State of Vermont does not factor in any of the additional decommissioning costs caused by the VY uprate. Those costs are delineated in this report.

- It is also our opinion that the Decommissioning Fund should be audited to make sure that Entergy is contributing to the growth of the Fund in a manner that is compatible with its operation of VY and both Entergy and Vermont Yankee's fiduciary responsibilities.
- Legally, Entergy should not be profiting at the expense of the Vermont ratepayers and its taxpayers.
 - What did the legislature originally negotiate with Entergy regarding the Decommissioning Fund for the Certificate of Public Good that engendered them to operate and profit from the operation of Vermont Yankee?
- Finally, according to an Associated Press article written by Vermont journalist David Gram, Vermont Yankee's contract that is delivering its allegedly cheap power lasts only through the expiration of the plant's license in 2012. Any electricity produced after that time would have to be renegotiated among the plant's previous owners, a consortium of New England utilities led by CVPS and GMP.
 - What were the actual negotiations among those utilities and Entergy in 2002?
 - Since the utilities originally owned VY and are currently benefitting from the lower rate power, what responsibility do they have to assure an adequate Decommissioning Fund, and does their original contract with Entergy give them any leverage in increasing the Fund to the required level?

Again, it is our belief these types of questions should be reviewed by attorneys well versed in energy regulation and with a thorough examination of the original contract negotiated in 2002 between Entergy and the consortium from which it purchased Vermont Yankee.