UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
475 ALLENDALE RD, STE 102
KING OF PRUSSIA, PENNSYLVANIA 19406-1415

September 28, 2022

Brad Berryman
Senior Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer
Susquehanna Nuclear, LLC
769 Salem Blvd., NUCSB3
Berwick, PA 18603

SUBJECT: SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2 – DESIGN BASIS ASSURANCE INSPECTION (TEAMS) INSPECTION REPORT 05000387/2022013 AND 05000388/2022013

Dear Brad Berryman:

On August 25, 2022, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2 and discussed the results of this inspection with Kevin Cimorelli, Site Vice President and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

If you contest the violation or the significance or severity of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2.

If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2.

This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the *Code of Federal Regulations* 2.390, "Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding."

Sincerely,

Melvin K. Gray

Digitally signed by Melvin K. Gray
Date: 2022.09.28 08:24:23 -04'00'

Mel Gray, Chief
Engineering Branch 1
Division of Operating Reactor Safety

Docket Nos. 05000387 and 05000388
License Nos. NPF-14 and NPF-22

Enclosure:
As stated

cc w/ encl: Distribution via LISTSERV

SUBJECT: SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2 – DESIGN BASIS ASSURANCE INSPECTION (TEAMS) INSPECTION REPORT 05000387/2022013 AND 05000388/2022013 DATED SEPTEMBER 28, 2022

DISTRIBUTION:
JGreives, DORS
LCasey, DORS
CHighley, DORS, SRI
MRossi, DORS, RI
DHochmuth, DORS, AA
LMcKown, RI OEDO
RidsNrrPMSusquehanna Resource
RidsNrrDorlLpl1 Resource

DOCUMENT NAME: https://usnrc.sharepoint.com/teams/Region-I-EB1/Inspections/DBAI (Teams)/Susquehanna/SUS DBAI IR 2022-013.docx
ADAMS ACCESSION NUMBER: ML22270A222

X SUNSI Review		X Non-Sensitive ☐ Sensitive		X Publicly Available ☐ Non-Publicly Available	
OFFICE	RI/DORS	RI/DORS	RI/DORS		
NAME	GStock	JGreives	MGray		
DATE	9/22/22	9/19/22	9/26/22		

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Inspection Report

Docket Numbers:	05000387 and 05000388
License Numbers:	NPF-14 and NPF-22
Report Numbers:	05000387/2022013 and 05000388/2022013
Enterprise Identifier:	I-2022-013-0004
Licensee:	Susquehanna Nuclear, LLC
Facility:	Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2
Location:	Berwick, PA
Inspection Dates:	August 7, 2022 to August 25, 2022
Inspectors:	C. Bickett, Senior Reactor Analyst J. DeBoer, Senior Project Engineer B. Dyke, Operations Engineer J. Lilliendahl, Senior Emergency Response Coordinator J. Schoppy, Senior Reactor Inspector G. Stock, Senior Resident Inspector
Approved By:	Mel Gray, Chief Engineering Branch 1 Division of Operating Reactor Safety

Enclosure

SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensee's performance by conducting a design basis assurance inspection (teams) inspection at Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.

List of Findings and Violations

Failure to Establish Appropriate Work Order Instructions for Work Activities on a Safety-Related Residual Heat Removal Service Water Valve			
Cornerstone	Significance	Cross-Cutting Aspect	Report Section
Mitigating Systems	Green NCV 05000387/2022013-01 Open/Closed	[H.1] - Resources	71111.21M
The team identified a Green finding and associated non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," because Susquehanna personnel did not establish appropriate work order instructions for work activities on the Unit 1 safety-related residual heat removal service water (RHRSW) system.			

Additional Tracking Items

None.

INSPECTION SCOPES

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, "Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase." The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

REACTOR SAFETY

71111.21M - Design Bases Assurance Inspection (Teams)

The inspectors evaluated the following components and listed applicable attributes, permanent modifications, and operating experience:

Design Review - Risk-Significant/Low Design Margin Components (IP Section 02.02) (4 Samples)

(1) Time sensitive operator action - Align 'E' Emergency Diesel Generator to U2 ESS Bus

- Material condition and installed configuration (e.g., visual inspection/walkdown)
- Normal, abnormal, and emergency operating procedures
- Consistency among design and licensing bases and other documents/procedures
- System health report, maintenance records, and corrective action history
- Equipment/environmental controls and qualification
- Adequacy of design (calculations and modifications)
- Surveillance testing and test results
- System and component level performance monitoring
- Equipment protection from fire, flood, steam, water intrusion, or spray
- Heat removal, cooling water and ventilation
- Operator actions
- Energy source availability (electricity, fuel, air)

The team used Appendix B guidance for *Valves, Pumps, Instrumentation, and As-Built System*.

(2) Unit 2 ESS 4.1kV Switchgear 2A201 Bus (Failure to Operate)

- Material condition and installed configuration (e.g., visual inspection/walkdown)
- Normal, abnormal, and emergency operating procedures
- Consistency among design and licensing bases and other documents/procedures
- Maintenance records and corrective action history
- Adequacy of design (calculations and modifications)
- Surveillance testing and test results

- System and component level performance monitoring
- Control logic
- Component adequacy for minimum voltage
- Protection coordination (load in-rush and full load current)
- Operator actions
- Energy source availability (electricity, steam, fuel, air)

The team used Appendix B guidance for *Circuit Breakers, Cables, Electrical Loads, Motor Control Centers (MCCs), and As-built System*.

(3) Unit 1 250VDC Battery 1D650

- Material condition and installed configuration (e.g., visual inspection/walkdown)
- Normal, abnormal, and emergency operating procedures
- Consistency among design and licensing bases and other documents/procedures
- System health report, maintenance effectiveness and records, and corrective action history
- Design calculations
- Surveillance testing and recent test results
- Energy source availability (electricity)

The team used Appendix B guidance for *Instrumentation, Circuit Breakers and Fuses, Cables, Electric Loads, and As-Built System*.

(4) Unit 1 Residual Heat Removal Service Water (Failure to Provide Suppression Pool Cooling)

- Material condition and installed configuration (e.g., visual inspection/walkdown)
- Normal, abnormal, and emergency operating procedures
- Consistency among design and licensing bases and other documents/procedures
- System health report, maintenance effectiveness and records, and corrective action history
- Equipment/environmental controls and qualification
- Design calculations
- Surveillance testing and recent test results
- System and component level performance monitoring
- Equipment protection from fire, flood, and water intrusion or spray
- Operator actions
- Heat removal cooling water and ventilation

The team used Appendix B guidance for *Valves, Pumps, Instrumentation, and As-Built System*.

Design Review - Large Early Release Frequency (LERFs) (IP Section 02.02) (1 Sample)

(1) Unit 1 High Pressure Coolant Injection System (Failure to Operate)
- Material condition and installed configuration (e.g., visual inspection/walkdown)
- Normal, abnormal, and emergency operating procedures
- Consistency among design and licensing bases and other documents/procedures
- System health report, maintenance records, and corrective action history
- Surveillance testing and test results
- System and component level performance monitoring
- Control logic
- Operator actions
- Process medium availability (water, air, electrical signal)
- Energy source availability (electricity, steam, fuel, air)

The team used Appendix B guidance for *Valves, Pumps, Instrumentation, and As-Built System*.

Modification Review - Permanent Mods (IP Section 02.03) (5 Samples)

(1) DEC 2471627 – RHRSW Cable FF1S0601A Repair
(2) DEC 1974016 - 1X240 Engineered Safeguard System Load Center Transformer Replacement
(3) DEC 2159657 - Add a Hydraulic Booster to 'E' EDG Governor
(4) DEC 2489798 - Increase Set Point of PSV21213A
(5) TDC 2308928 - Bypass Battery Cell #120 on Battery 2D660, 250VDC Battery Bank B

Review of Operating Experience Issues (IP Section 02.06) (2 Samples)

(1) NRC Information Notice 2019-01: Inadequate Evaluation of Temporary Alterations, dated March 12, 2019
(2) NRC Information Notice 2020-02: Flex Diesel Generator Operational Challenges

INSPECTION RESULTS

<table>
<tr><td colspan="4">Failure to Establish Appropriate Work Order Instructions for Work Activities on a Safety-Related Residual Heat Removal Service Water Valve</td></tr>
<tr><td>Cornerstone</td><td>Significance</td><td>Cross-Cutting Aspect</td><td>Report Section</td></tr>
<tr><td>Mitigating Systems</td><td>Green
NCV 05000387/2022013-01
Open/Closed</td><td>[H.1] - Resources</td><td>71111.21M</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="4">The team identified a Green finding and associated non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," because Susquehanna personnel did not establish appropriate work order instructions for work activities on the Unit 1 safety-related residual heat removal service water (RHRSW) system.</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="4">Description: On April 17, 2020, operators initiated CR 2020-05941 to document that the HV-11210A RHRSW heat exchanger (HX) inlet valve stem appeared to separate from the motor operator. At the time, Unit 1 was in a refueling outage, Mode 5, with irradiated fuel in the</td></tr>
</table>

vessel, with the ‘A’ loop of RHRSW in service supporting shutdown cooling (SDC) operation. Operators attempted to adjust HV-11210A for SDC temperature control but noted no change in system flow and pressure. Operators confirmed actuator motor operation locally, but observed no valve stem travel. The as-left position of the valve was midway open (approximately 45%) with sufficient flow to satisfy SDC requirements for plant conditions. Based on this position, operators determined that the ‘A’ residual heat removal (RHR) SDC subsystem remained operable. At the time, the ‘B’ RHR SDC subsystem was also operable and available. Operators satisfactorily maintained SDC in service on the ‘A’ loop of RHRSW until placing the ‘B’ SDC subsystem in service on April 18, 2020, in order to troubleshoot and repair the HV-11210A. The Susquehanna Fix It Now (FIN) team performed troubleshooting under Work Order 2335031 and replaced and properly torqued the actuator coupling bolts on April 19, 2020. Following a successful post-maintenance test (PMT), operators declared the HV-11210A valve operable.

During the design bases inspection, the team reviewed CR 2020-05941 and Susquehanna’s associated corrective actions and noted that the Management Review Committee (MRC) assigned the CR a significance level 4 which resulted in a broke/fix approach with no causal analysis. Based on subsequent review, the team identified that maintenance removed the HV11210A actuator from the valve under Work Order 2197505 earlier in the April 2020 refueling outage to facilitate inspection of the RHRSW piping inlet flange supplying the ‘A’ RHR HX. Following the planned maintenance, maintenance personnel completed a leak check PMT on April 7, 2020, and operators completed a successful stroke time test on April 7, 2020, and declared the valve operable. However, the team noted that Work Order 2197505 did not contain adequate guidance to either maintain the coupling intact between the valve and actuator when removing the valve from the RHRSW piping or to retorque the coupling bolts to the proper torque value if reassembly of the coupling joint was required. The team concluded that the maintenance personnel’s failure to adequately torque the stem to actuator coupling bolts directly contributed to the subsequent malfunction of the valve during SDC operations on April 17, 2020. In response to the team’s assessment, the licensee initiated CR 2022-12358 on August 8, 2022, to address the work order instruction deficiencies. The team noted that the assignment of the initial CR (2020-05941) as a significance level 4 in April 2020, with no causal analysis and/or extent-of-condition review, represented a missed opportunity for the licensee to self-identify the underlying performance deficiency and evaluate the potential extent-of-condition in a more timely manner commensurate with the potential safety significance.

In addition, the team reviewed the extent-of-condition as maintenance personnel had performed similar work activities on the Unit 1 ‘B’ RHRSW HX supply valve (HV-11210B), Unit 2 ‘A’ RHRSW HX supply valve (HV-21210A), and Unit 2 ‘B’ RHRSW HX supply valve (HV-21210B). HV 11210B was removed under Work Order 2366440 in April 2022. HV 21210A was removed under Work Order 2277134 in April 2021. HV 21210B was removed under Work Order 2114861 in April 2019. The three work orders documented that the valve and actuator were not decoupled for the respective valves; thus, the team determined that continued operability of these safety-related valves was not called into question based on the extent-of-condition review. However, the team identified that two of the three work orders also contained less than adequate guidance with respect to the coupling torque. Precaution 4.2 in Work Order 2277134 stated that the valve and actuator were to be removed as a unit (“DO NOT remove the operator from the valve”). However, there was not adequate guidance in the other two work orders (2366440 & 2114861) to maintain the valve and actuator coupled. In fact, for Work Order 2114861, a pen and ink change was made to the work order on

March 19, 2019, prior to the work commencing, to “remove HBC and actuator as needed.” However, in that case, the documentation provided in the work order package indicated that that option was not exercised and the actuator was not removed. In addition, those two work orders did not provide guidance for retorqueing the coupling if the actuator was removed.

In reviewing the work history and operating experience associated with these RHRSW valves, the team noted that the licensee had encountered previous issues with actuator coupling bolts becoming loose in 2015. Specifically, on March 23, 2015, the licensee initiated CR 2015-8083 to address loose actuator coupling bolts that caused the Unit 2 ‘A’ RHRSW HX supply valve (HV-21210A) to fail to close while attempting to shut down the 2A RHRSW pump. The team noted that the licensee’s short-term corrective actions following the malfunction in March 2015 appeared much more thorough and responsive than their actions following the malfunction in April 2020. In particular, their actions in 2015 included an extent-of condition review, causal analysis, and implementing a recurring task preventive maintenance task to perform coupling torque checks.

Although the valve failure in April 2020 was self-revealing, the license’s initial corrective actions consisted of initiating a CR (level 4) and assigning the FIN team to troubleshoot and repair (a broke/fix approach) without performing an associated causal analysis or extent-of-condition review. Additional NRC follow-up during the 2022 design basis assurance inspection resulted in the identification of the inadequate work order instructions and prompted the extent-of-condition review to assess the continued operability of similar Unit 1 and Unit 2 RHRSW valves. (See extent-of-condition review discussed above.) As such, due to the NRC value-added during the inspection, the team determined that the issue was best classified as “NRC-identified” vice “self-revealing.”

Corrective Actions: The licensee’s immediate corrective actions included initiating CR 2020-05941 and repairing the valve in April 2020. Subsequently, the licensee initiated CR 2022-12358 to revise the work instruction library files associated with valves HV11210A/B and HV21210A/B to clarify that the valve and motor operator are to be removed as a unit and to not disturb the electrical setup or mechanical connections. In addition, the action stated to also consider revising the work instructions to add steps to be taken if the motor operator would need to be removed to ensure that the proper procedures and operating manuals associated with the motor operator and stem coupling are considered.

Corrective Action References: CR 2020-05941 and CR 2022-12358

Performance Assessment:

Performance Deficiency: The licensee did not provide adequate work order instructions related to planned work on the safety-related ‘A’ RHR HX inlet flange resulting in the subsequent in service malfunction of RHRSW valve HV 11210A. Specifically, Work Order 2197505 did not provide adequate guidance to either maintain the coupling intact between the valve and actuator when removing the valve from the RHRSW piping or to retorque the coupling bolts to the proper torque value if reassembly of the coupling joint was required. The team concluded that the failure to develop and implement adequate work order instructions was reasonably foreseeable and preventable and was a performance deficiency given the licensee’s internal operating experience in 2015.

Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Procedure Quality attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability,

reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the team determined that maintenance work activities involving the HV 11210A RHRSW valve adversely affected the availability, reliability, and capability of the RHRSW system. The team compared this performance deficiency against examples in IMC 0612, Appendix E, "Examples of Minor Issues," effective January 1, 2021, and found similarities to example 4.c. Specifically, the HV 11210A valve was returned to service after work activities but because of the inadequate work order instructions, maintenance decoupled the stem and actuator but did not adequately re-torque the bolts during reassembly resulting in a subsequent malfunction of the valve while in service for SDC.

Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609, Appendix G, "Shutdown Safety SDP." In accordance with IMC 0609, Appendix G, Attachment 1, Exhibit 3, the team determined that the finding screened to Green since the deficiency affected the design or qualification of a mitigating SSC that maintained its operability.

Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.1 - Resources: Leaders ensure that personnel, equipment, procedures, and other resources are available and adequate to support nuclear safety. Contrary to this, Susquehanna personnel did not ensure that work order instructions were adequate to support safety-related work on the RHRSW system.

Enforcement:

Violation: 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," states that activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, or drawings, of a type appropriate to the circumstances and shall be accomplished in accordance with these instructions, procedures, or drawings.

Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS

The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

- On August 25, 2022, the inspectors presented the design basis assurance inspection (teams) inspection results to Kevin Cimorelli, Site Vice President and other members of the licensee staff.
- On August 30, 2022, the inspectors presented the results of their review of FLEX generator testing to Dave Ambrose, Engineering General Manager and other members of the licensee staff.

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
71111.21M	Calculations	EC-054-1027	Pipe-Flo Model – ESW and RHRSW Systems	5
		EC-088-0505	Unit 1 and Unit 2 Class 1E 250VDC System Voltage Drop Calculation	8
		EC-088-0506	Class 1E 250VDC Battery Sizing and Battery Charger Sizing for 1D650, 2D650, and 2D660	7
		EC-088-1005	Battery 1D650 Load Profile	5
		EC-FLEX-0013	Fukushima Flex Generators - RHR Motor Start and Load Flow Analysis	0
		EC-FLEX-0015	Fukushima Flex Generators - Phase 2 Load Flow Analysis	3
		EC-RISK-1162	Performance Criteria for EDG E Ability to Substitute	0
		EC-SOPC-0618	Relay Setting Calculation for Transformer 1X240 Circuit Breaker Overcurrent at Bus 1A204 and Undervoltage/Overvoltage at Load Center 1B240	1
		EC-SOPC-0739	RHR Pump Unit 1 and 2	0
	Corrective Action Documents	AR-2014-02355		
		AR-2015-08278		
		CR-2014-21439		
		CR-2015-08083		
		CR-2017-12589		
		CR-2018-09178		
		CR-2018-13000		
		CR-2019-07041		
		CR-2019-10706		
		CR-2020-01392		
		CR-2020-03941		
		CR-2020-05274		
		CR-2020-05597		
		CR-2020-05920		
		CR-2020-05941		
		CR-2020-09452		
		CR-2021-11116		

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
		CR-2021-12192		
		CR-2021-14609		
		CR-2021-14690		
		CR-2022-04654		
		CR-2022-05704		
		CR-2022-05939		
		CR-2022-11912		
		CR-2022-12999		
	Corrective Action Documents Resulting from Inspection	CR-2022-12068		
		CR-2022-12077		
		CR-2022-12078		
		CR-2022-12089		
		CR-2022-12103		
		CR-2022-12107		
		CR-2022-12109		
		CR-2022-12118		
		CR-2022-12125		
		CR-2022-12128		
		CR-2022-12130		
		CR-2022-12137		
		CR-2022-12138		
		CR-2022-12170		
		CR-2022-12194		
		CR-2022-12196		
		CR-2022-12211		
		CR-2022-12212		
		CR-2022-12249		
		CR-2022-12271		
		CR-2022-12351		
		CR-2022-12353		
		CR-2022-12358		
		CR-2022-12592		
		CR-2022-12670		

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
		CR-2022-12740		
		CR-2022-12859		
		CR-2022-12864		
		CR-2022-12866		
		CR-2022-12868		
		CR-2022-12964		
		CR-2022-12973		
		CR-2022-12978		
		CR-2022-12990		
		CR-2022-13002		
		CR-2022-13006		
		CR-2022-13007		
	Drawings	E-11, Sheet 1	Unit 1 and Common Single Line Meter and Relay Diagram 125VDC and 250VDC	19
		E-11, Sheet 2	Unit 1 Single Line Meter and Relay Diagram 125VDC and 250VDC	28
		E106260 Sheet 1	Unit 1 High Pressure Coolant Injection P&ID	60
		E107150 Sheet 1	Susquehanna SES Unit 1 and 2 Single Line Diagram Station	44
		E107154 Sheet 2	Susquehanna SES Unit 2 Single Line Meter and Relay Diagram 4.16KV Engineering Safeguards Power System	32
		M-112	Unit 1 RHR Service Water P&ID	55
	Engineering Changes	DEC 1974016	1X240 Engineered Safeguard System Load Center Transformer Replacement	0
		DEC 2159657	Add a Hydraulic Booster to the EDG E Governor	0
		DEC 2489798	Design Equivalent Change Package - Increase Set Point of PSV21213A	0
		TDC 2308928	Temporary Bypass Battery Cell #120 on Battery 2D660	0
	Miscellaneous	DBD004	Design Basis Document for High Pressure Coolant Injection System	6
		DBD009	Design Basis Document for ESW, RHRSW, and Ultimate Heat Sink	4
		IOM224 Section A	Wafer-Sphere Butterfly Valves Installation, Maintenance and Operating Instructions	05/01/1996

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
		OP-AD-327-1	SCRAM Event Summary (Unit 1)	05/23/2022
		SE-116-301	RHRSW System Leakage Test	06/22/2022
		SM-188-104	48 Monthly Div I 1D650-250VDC Battery Discharge Test	04/04/2020
		SO-116-A02	Quarterly RHRSW Valve Exercising Division I	04/08/2020
		SO-116-A03	Quarterly Residual Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW) System Flow Verification Division I	06/22/2022
		SO-116-A04	Residual Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW) System Comprehensive Flow Verification Division I	09/22/2021
		SO-116-B03	Quarterly Residual Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW) System Flow Verification Division II	04/08/2022 and 06/14/2022
		SO-116-B04	Residual Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW) System Comprehensive Flow Verification Division II	09/16/2021
		SO-152-004	Quarterly HPCI Valve Exercising	06/06/2022
		SO-152-006	High Pressure Coolant Injection Comprehensive Flow Verification	12/16/2020
		SUS-ISTPLN-100.0	SSES Unit 1 Inservice Testing Program	9
	Procedures	DC-FLEX-010	4160 VAC Connection to E DG and ESS Buses	8
		IP-ENG-001	Standard Design Process	1
		MFP-QA-5250	Control Structure PLRT and Reactor Building NLRT Boundary Breaches and Penetration Seals	18
		N-DAP-QA-0343	Time Critical and Time Sensitive Operator Actions	5
		NDAP-QA-0409	Door, Floor Plug and Hatch Control	21
		NDAP-QA-0423	Station Pump and Valve Test Program	38
		NDAP-QA-0515	Control and Calibration of Plant Measuring and Test Equipment (M&TE)	16
		NDAP-QA-1218	Temporary Changes	21
		ON-LOOP-101	Unit 1 Loss of All Offsite Power	5
		ON-LOOP-201	Unit 2 Loss of All Offsite Power	5
		OP-024-004	Transfer and Test Mode Operations of Diesel Generator E	38
		OP-116-001	RHR Service Water	60
		OP-149-002	RHR Shutdown Cooling	85

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
		OP-152-001	HPCI System	66
	Work Orders	1256448		
		1413955		
		1862427		
		1887276		
		1906956		
		1919129		
		1984180		
		1992666		
		2040721		
		2114861		
		2130256		
		2183390		
		2197505		
		2197657		
		2198398		
		2212723		
		2222772		
		2274265		
		2277134		
		2279019		
		2299854		
		2301244		
		2312553		
		2318398		
		2335031		
		2336487		
		2336487		
		2341550		
		2360013		
		2364432		
		2366440		
		2377028		

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
		2405665		
		2441817		
		2471399		
		2527845		
		2543385		
		2544558		
		2562247		
		2562501		