TMI missing flood barriers to protect safety related equipment

Facility: THREE MILE ISLAND

Event Number: 46194

Event Date: 08/21/2010

FLOOD BARRIERS NEEDED TO PROTECT SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT MISSING

"On August 21, 2010 an inspection of the Air Intake Tunnel (AIT) sump identified missing flood barriers needed to protect safety related equipment in the plant. If enough flood water had entered into the AIT, water could have entered into the Auxiliary Building (AB) through the ventilation ductwork that connects the AIT and the AB. If flood water continued to enter the AB, then safety related equipment in the AB could have been affected.

"This condition could have resulted in the unavailability of equipment in the Auxiliary Building including the 1A and 1B Decay Heat pumps, the 1A and 1B Building Spray pumps and 1A, 1B and 1C Make-up Pumps. This is reportable as an 8 hour ENS notification under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) and 10CFR50.72(a)(1)(ii) as a condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to remove residual heat.

"Flood protection barriers have been established for the affected penetrations. Inspections of the flood protection barriers are ongoing. Further engineering review is being performed to determine the impact of the potential water intrusion into the AIT and AB."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The licensee will notify the Pennsylvania Bureau of Radiation Protection.

Gulf Oil Spill & Nuclear Plants: NRC Responds to TMI-Alert's Inquiry

From the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission:

This letter is in response to your letter to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) dated June 14, 2010, concerning prevention of safety problems at coastal nuclear plants that could be caused by the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico (Gulf oil spill).    In your June 14, 2010, letter, you sought assurances that the proper federal and state agencies are working in a coordinated and comprehensive effort to prevent safety problems at coastal nuclear plants related to the Gulf oil spill. We understand your inquiry regarding the monitoring of subsurface oil plumes has been addressed in a letter from Captain Kevin C. Kiefer, Staff Director of the U. S. Coast Guard (USCG), National Incident Command (NIC) to TMI Alert, Attn: Scott Portzline, dated July 21,2010.

Download ML1022300609 to read more

Peach Bottom: Safety Limit Minimum Critical Power Ratio Change

Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Unit 2 - Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request for Safety Limit Minimum Critical Power Ratio Change (TAC No. ME3994)

Download ML102150140 (PDF)

Not so easy to recycle nuclear waste

From the Rutland Herald:

In the Aug.10 public radio program “Vermont Edition,” the three Republican candidates to the U.S. House of Representatives discussed briefly our energy policy. Two candidates voiced a strong, but misguided support for the fast breeder nuclear reactors, and the statement was made that “we should build fast breeders, recycle the nuclear waste and get rid of it, instead of leaving it to our children.”

Nothing is farther from the truth. Although we hear it often, fast breeders cannot recycle waste and get rid of it. Nuclear power is generated by the fission of nuclear fuel, and each fission creates two radioactive fission products. Therefore, the fission products accumulate during the reactor operation, regardless of the type of reactor or the type of fuel considered. The more reactors operate, the more fission products we will have to deal with. There is no physical way to “burn” or recycle this waste. Fission products are here to stay until their natural decay transmutes them into something else. Unfortunately, this decay process can last for thousands of years.

Read more

Gundersens, state agencies, Entergy clash over VY

From the Brattleboro Reformer:

In its report to the Legislature's Joint Fiscal Committee, submitted on July 26 and released to the public on Aug. 12, Fairewinds Associates, which is operated by Arnie and Maggie Gundersen, wrote that state agencies conspired to "belittle the accurate analysis of Fairewinds Associates, Inc. rather than investigate the existence of underground pipes at (Vermont Yankee nuclear power plant)."

Fairewinds Associates was commissioned to perform a number of assessments of Yankee for the JFC.

Arnie Gundersen was a member of the Public Oversight Panel that reviewed a reliability assessment of Yankee commissioned by the state. The assessment was meant to inform the state on whether the power plant should gain approval to continue its operation past 2012, its license expiration date. Entergy, which owns and operates Yankee, has applied to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to extend its license. The NRC has yet to issue its decision, but the state Legislature voted earlier this year against Yankee's continued operation.

Read more

Peach Bottom: Extending completion time for "Standby Liquid Control system"

Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2 and 3: Acceptance of License Amendment Request Related to Extending Completion Time for Technical Specification 3.1.7, "Standby Liquid Control system" (TAC Nos. ME3598 and ME3599)
 

Download ML102180338 (PDF)

Global Warming Shuts Down LaSalle

Facility: LASALLE
Event Number: 46171
Event Date: 08/12/2010

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIRED SHUTDOWN DUE TO ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS RESULTING IN ELEVATED ULTIMATE HEAT SINK TEMPERATURE

"At 2050 [CDT] on 8/12/10, LaSalle Unit 1 and Unit 2 commenced a Plant Shutdown. At 1952 [CDT] on 8/12/10, LaSalle Ultimate Heat Sink exceeded the 101.25?F limit per Technical Specification LCO 3.7.3, Condition B. Per Technical Specification LCO 3.7.3, Required Action B.1, both Unit 1 and Unit 2 are to be in Mode 3 (Hot Shutdown) in 12 hours. Per Technical Specification LCO 3.7.3 Required Action B.2, both Unit 1 and Unit 2 are to be in Mode 4 (Cold Shutdown) in 36 hours. Technical Specification LCO 3.7.3, Ultimate Heat Sink requires that both Unit 1 and Unit 2 to be in MODE 3 by 8/13/10 at 0752 [CDT] and MODE 4 by 8/14/10 at 0752 [CDT].

"Unit 1 was initially at 76% Power due to a response to elevated Main Condenser In-Leakage, not related to the Ultimate Heat Sink High Temperature. Unit 2 was initially at 82% Power due to elevated Condensate Temperature and in response to worsening Main Condenser Backpressure. For Unit 2, both of these parameters were related to the elevated Ultimate Heat Sink Temperature.

"The Ultimate Heat Sink Temperature is currently 101.33?F. All Systems are responding as expected."

This condition is a result of the hot environmental conditions and is not due to any equipment problems or other operating issues at the site.

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Susquehanna: NRC Inspection Report 05000387/2010003 and 05000388/2010003

Susquehanna Steam Electric Station - NRC Integrated Inspection Report 05000387/2010003 and 05000388/2010003

Download ML102250028 (PDF)

Review of Pilgrim nuclear license is among the longest in country

From the Patriot Ledger:

The Pilgrim nuclear power plant is one of only three power plants in the country whose relicensing requests have taken longer than the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s self-imposed 30-month deadline to resolve.

In recent letters to Sen. John Kerry and Rep. William Delahunt, NRC Chairman Gregory Jaczko wrote that his agency issued 59 license renewals at 34 sites and had 14 license renewal applications under review. Of those, Entergy Corp.’s Pilgrim plant in Plymouth is one of only three that have not been resolved in a 30-month window. The others include Vermont Yankee in Vernon, Vt., and the Oyster Creek plant in New Jersey. The Oyster Creek license was renewed in 2009, while Entergy’s Vermont Yankee request is still being considered.

Jaczko, who was responding to inquiries from Kerry and Delahunt, attributed the delays at Pilgrim to the complexity of issues being raised as a panel of judges reviews Entergy’s relicensing request.

Read more

10 CFR Part 26 and Susquehanna

Good Day:

Daily Event Report No. 46164 dated Augusr 10, 2010, involves an incident at the Susquehanna Unit 1 reactor.

It reported that "a member of the SSES work force was feeling ill effects from a Freon-12 leak."

It also reported that no "medical attention was required."

Section 26.23 of 10 CFR Part 26 defines the performance objectives for fitness-for-duty programs.

Paragraph (b) explicitly states that one of those performance objectives is:

"Provide reasonable assurance that individuals are not under the influence of any substance, legal or illegal, or mentally or physically impaired from any cause, which in any way adversely affects their ability to safely and competently perform their duties."

Freon-12 is a "substance, legal or illegal."

Freon-12 "physically impaired" a worker at SSES Unit 1.

That "physically impaired" worker received no "medial attention."

This is not, repeat not, an allegation that the licensee violated 10 CFR Part 26.

Instead, this is a question. Will the NRC be looking into whether this licensee complied with 10 CFR Part 26 when it provided no medical attention to a worker inside the protected area who self-declared being impaired by a substance, legal or illegal?

Thanks,

David Lochbaum
Director, Nuclear Safety Project
Union of Concerned Scientists
PO Box 15316
Chattanooga, TN 37415
(423) 468-9272 office
(423) 488-8318 cell

Syndicate content