Good Day:
I made the attached presentation during an NRC Commission briefing on Fukushima lessons learned and status this morning. The chair and co-chair of the NAS committee that authored the report issued last week also made presentations, which are or soon will be archived (somewhere) on the NRC's website.
Dave Lochbaum

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Join NIRS and a cast of thousands for the nuclear-free, carbon-free contingent to the People's Climate March September 21 in New York City. Details for the event are evolving rapidly; check here regularly for new materials and information.

The route of the March has now been agreed to with NYPD:

- Assemble in area north of Columbus Circle
- leave Columbus Circle and go east on 59th Street
- turn onto 6th Ave. and go south to 42nd Street
- turn right onto 42nd Street and go west to 11th Ave
- turn left on 11th Ave. and go south to 34th Street

End Location: on 11th Ave. in the streets between 34th Street and 38th Street

Time of the March, assembly location for Nuclear-Free, Carbon-Free Contingent and other details are not completed. We will update here as more information is confirmed.


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Date:  July 24, 2014


Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Accident Underscores Need to Actively Seek Out and Act on New Information About Nuclear Plant Hazards, Says New NAS Report

WASHINGTON – A new congressionally mandated report from the National Academy of Sciences concludes that the overarching lesson learned from the 2011 Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident is that nuclear plant licensees and their regulators must actively seek out and act on new information about hazards with the potential to affect the safety of nuclear plants.  The committee that wrote the report examined the causes of the Japan accident and identified findings and recommendations for improving nuclear plant safety and offsite emergency responses to nuclear plant accidents in the U.S.

The accident at the Fukushima Daiichi plant was initiated by the Great East Japan Earthquake and tsunami on March 11, 2011.  The earthquake knocked out offsite AC power to the plant, and the tsunami inundated portions of the plant site.  Flooding of critical equipment resulted in the extended loss of onsite power with the consequent loss of reactor monitoring, control, and cooling functions in multiple units.  Three reactors -- Units 1, 2, and 3 -- sustained severe core damage, and three reactor buildings -- Units 1, 3, and 4 -- were damaged by hydrogen explosions.  Offsite releases of radioactive materials contaminated land in Fukushima and several neighboring prefectures, prompting widespread evacuations, distress among the population, large economic losses, and the eventual shutdown of all nuclear power plants in Japan.  

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On July 21, 2014, the Waste Confidence Directorate provided the Commission with the draft final documents for the Continued Storage rulemaking (formerly Waste Confidence).  These documents are called “draft” final documents because until the Commission reviews and approves them for publication, they are not truly final—the Commission could approve, modify, or disapprove these documents.  These documents are not for public comment, however, the NRC is releasing them to the public in accordance with Commission procedures.  The draft final rulemaking documents can be accessed in the Agencywide Documents Access Management System (ADAMS):

· SECY-14-0072: Final Rule: Continued Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel (RIN 3150-AJ20) – ADAMS Accession No. ML14177A474  à

· Final Rule:  Continued Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel (Federal Register notice) – ADAMS Accession No. ML14177A477  à

· NUREG-2157, Generic Environmental Impact Statement for Continued Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel – Final Report – ADAMS Accession No. ML14188B749  à

All three documents can also be accessed on the Waste Confidence website homepage:

Please note that in response to public comments, the NRC staff is proposing to change the title of the rulemaking from Waste Confidence to Continued Storage.  For an explanation of this proposed change, please see Section IV, Issue 4, in the draft final Federal Register notice, or Section D.2.1.4 in Appendix D of the draft final NUREG-2157.  Similarly, we direct you to Appendix D for information about how the staff proposes to respond to comments received on the proposed rule and draft generic environmental impact statement.

These documents are not for public comment.


Thank you,

Staff of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Waste Confidence Directorate

Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2 and 3 - Relaxation of Response Due Dates Regarding Flooding Hazard Reevaluations for Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of the Insights from the Fukushima Dai-Ichi Accident (TAC Nos. MF3671 and MF3672)

Download ML14174A879


Incident Chronology at TMI from NRC: 1979-2014

March 28, 1979, 4:00 a.m. - Beginning of the Three Mile Island (TMI) Unit-2 loss-of-coolant, core melt accident. The plant came within 30 minutes of a full meltdown. The reactor vessel was destroyed, and large amounts of unmonitored radiation was released directly into the community.

March 28, 1979, 4:30 p.m. - Press conference of Lt. Governor William Scranton:
This is an update on the incident at Three-Mile Island Nuclear Power Plant today. This situation is more complex than the company first led us to believe. We are taking more tests. And at this point, we believe there is still no danger to public health. Metropolitan Edison has given you and us conflicting information. We just concluded a meeting with company officials and hope this briefing will clear up most of your questions. There has been a release of radioactivity into the environment. The magnitude of this release is still being determined, but there is no evidence yet that it has resulted in the presence of dangerous levels. The company has informed us that from about 11 a.m. until about 1:30 p.m., Three-Mile Island discharged into the air, steam that contained detectable amounts of radiation.

March 30, 1979 - Governor Richard Thornburgh recommended an evacuation for preschool children and pregnant women living within five miles of the plant. Out of a target population of 5,000, over 140,000 Central Pennsylvanians fled the area. Schools in the area closed...

The U.S. House of Representatives committee examining reporting information during the accident concluded:

The record indicates that in reporting to State and federal officials on March 28, 1979, TMI managers did not communicate information in their possession that they understood to be related to the severity of the situation. The lack of such information prevented State and federal officials from accurately assessing the condition of the plant. In addition, the record indicates that TMI managers presented State and federal officials misleading statements (i.e. statements that were inaccurate and incomplete) that conveyed the impression the accident was substantially less severe and the situation more under control than what the managers themselves believed and what was in fact the case.

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Incident Chronology at Susquehanna Steam Electric Station in Berwick: 2010- 2011

This chronology does not include the cost to the rate payer
to build Susquehanna-1 and -2. PP&L asked the Public Utility
Commission (PUC) for $315 million to recover the cost of
building Unit-1. The PUC granted $203 million on August 22,
1983, or a 16% increase to the customer. The company asked for
$330 million for Unit-2 but was allowed $121 million in April,
1985; an 8% increase to rate payers. In addition, PP&L
consumers have “contributed”  approximately $4.6 million
annually (since 1985) to the decommissioning fund.
(Also,  refer  to  May  15  and  August  13,  1998,  for  information
on  “stranded  costs” passed on to  “hostage” PP&L  rate payers.)
Moreover, in the Winter 1999/2000, PPL unilaterally
devaluated the combined PURTA and Real Estate tax
assessments for the SSES. Prior to the Negotiated Settlement,
the nuclear power generating stations were assessed by PP&L at
approximately $1 billion. PPL is now claiming that the the SSES
is only worth $74 million or the same amount as the valuation of
the Columbia Hospital. If PPL prevails, the Berwick School
District and Luzerne County will experience revenue shock. PPL
is not paying or escrowing any moneys they owe to Luzerne
County and the Berwick School District.

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Peach Bottom Atomic Station, Units 2 and 3 - Staff Assessment of the Flooding Walkdown Report Supporting Implementation of Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Related to the Fukushima DAI-ICHI Nuclear Power Plant Accident (Tac Nos. MF0261 and MF0262)

Download ML14119A057


Three Mile Island, Unit 1 - Staff Assessment of the Flooding Walkdown Report Supporting Implementation of Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Related to the Fukushima Dai-Ichi Nuclear Power Plant Accident (Tac No. MF0290)

Download ML14156A238


Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2, Staff Assessment of The Flooding Walkdown Report Supporting Implementation of Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Related to The Fukushima Dai-Ichi Nuclear Power Plant Accident (MF0288 and MF0289)

Download ML14156A234