THREE MILE ISLAND NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT 1 - REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REGARDING RELIEF REQUEST RR-12-02, RELIEF REQUEST CONCERNING FULL STRUCTURAL WELD OVERLAY OF DISSIMILAR METAL WELDS ON THE LOWER COLD LEG LETDOWN NOZZLE AND SAFE-END (TAC NO. ME9818)
SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2 - EXEMPTION FROM THE BIENNIAL EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR PART 50, APPENDIX E, SECTION IV.F.2.b (TAC NOS. ME9845 AND ME9846)
Nov. 7, 2012 – Unit 1 at the Susquehanna Steam Electric Station resumed service after completing a turbine blade inspection. PPL, the plant owner, said the inspection found signs of cracking on a small number of turbines. The blades were replaced.
PPL also said it will shut down Unit 2 for a similar inspection in the near future.
Nov. 9, 2012 – Unit 2 at the Berwick area plant was shut down because a computer system controlling the reactor’s water level was not functioning properly.
Nov. 13, 2012 - The NRC issued a report on its third quarter inspection of Units 1 and 2 at the Susquehanna Steam Electric Station.
The report listed two NRC-identified findings and one self-revealing finding of very low safety significance.
Vermont SC Judge refuses to send VT Yankee protesters to jail following jury trial and "guilty" verdictSubmitted by webEditor on Mon, 12/03/2012 - 22:34
A Vermont Superior Court judge refused the request of the six members of the “Shut It Down Affinity Group” to send them to jail following a jury’s verdict of “guilty” on charges of criminal trespass. Instead, Judge John Wesley banned the women from further protest at the Fukushima-style nuclear reactor during a 45-day suspended sentence and fined them $350 each. The women refused to pay any fines and vowed that they would return to the controversial reactor site. The activists, Mary Kehler, Ellen Graves, nancy First, Hattie Nestel, Francis Crowe and Paki Wieland, all Massachusetts women ranging in ages from 69 to 93 years old, had freely admitted that they entered walked onto the property of Vermont Yankee operated by the New Orleans-base nuclear utility Entergy, pad locked the front gate closed and chained themselves t o the fence. The affinity group has carried out 22 nonviolent direct actions at the GE Mark I Boiling Water Reactor since 2006. “This is about shutting Vermont Yankee down. The state should be putting a padlock on the gate,” said Hattie Nestel. As American historian, Professor Howard Zinn has eloquently pointed out civil disobedience and democracy are inseparably intertwined in many major policy changes and social movements.
Status of 60-Day Response to Orders Modifying Licenses Regarding Recommendations 4.2, 5.1, and 7.1 of the Near-Term TaskSubmitted by webEditor on Fri, 11/30/2012 - 07:00
STATUS OF 60-DAY RESPONSE TO ORDERS MODIFYING LICENSES REGARDING RECOMMENDATIONS 4.2,5.1, AND 7.1 OF THE NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RELATED TO THE FUKUSHIMA DAI-ICHI NUCLEAR POWER PLANT ACCIDENT
The Waste Confidence Directorate received feedback that the webcast for the November 14 afternoon scoping meeting cut off at 4pm EST. We were able to get the webcast running again after a short delay; however, if you missed the end of that meeting, you can view archived video of the meeting at http://video.nrc.gov/. After you open the webpage, scroll down to the table of Archived Videos. The afternoon scoping meeting is titled: Waste Confidence Scoping Meeting for the Environmental Impact Statement (Part 1). The evening meeting (Part 2) is also available for viewing.
Transcripts for the November 14 meetings are now available in ADAMS:
Afternoon meeting transcript (ADAMS Accession No. ML12331A347): http://adamswebsearch2.nrc.gov/webSearch2/main.jsp?AccessionNumber='ML12331A347
Evening meeting transcript (ADAMS Accession No. ML12331A353): http://adamswebsearch2.nrc.gov/webSearch2/main.jsp?AccessionNumber='ML12331A353
If you missed the November 14 meetings, please join us for our December 5 (1pm-4pm EST) and December 6 (9pm-12am EST) webinars. The information presented and format of the webinars will be the same as the November meetings. The NRC staff will start each webinar with a short presentation (view the slides here), and then we’ll open the phone lines for your questions and comments. The webinars will be identical, and both will be transcribed so any comments presented over the phone will be included in the Waste Confidence docket.
To register for the December 5 or 6 webinars, please see our meeting notice (ADAMS Accession No. ML12326A911): http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1232/ML12326A911.pdf
You can also call Ms. TR Rowe at 1-800-368-5642, ext. 492-3133 or Ms. Susan Wittick, ext. 492-3187 if you have questions about the webinars.
And finally, we have updated our Waste Confidence website with some Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs): http://www.nrc.gov/waste/spent-fuel-storage/wcd/faq.html
Staff of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Waste Confidence Directorate
Twenty years ago today, Don Prevatte and I submitted a report under 10 CFR Part 21 to the NRC regarding a substantial safety hazard at nearly three dozen nuclear power plants.
Twenty years later, that substantial safety hazard still afflicts nearly three dozen nuclear power plants (slightly less now, because the Unit 1 reactor at the Millstone nuclear power plant permanently shut down in the interim).
Who didn't do what?
The following blog post highlights, or lowlights, the case along with links to key documents along this safety cul-de-sac:
Some of the stuff (like the NRC not realizing every other page was missing or falling asleep during our presentation on the subject) sounds made up. It wasn't. It was NRC inaction. (Nice if that someday became three words instead of two and it became easier to distinguish NRC's managers from store mannequins).
Will this substantial safety hazard remain unresolved twenty years from now?
Time will tell.
One would hope that a federal agency professing to give a hoot about nuclear safety might just be able to resolve a substantial safety hazard within forty years.
THREE MILE ISLAND NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT 1 - REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REGARDING 2011 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE INSPECTION REPORT (TAC NO. ME8735)
Pilgrim Watch Comment Regarding Additional Requirements For Containment Venting Systems For BWRs With Mark I And Mark II Containments In Support Of Filters And Rupture DiscsSubmitted by webEditor on Mon, 11/19/2012 - 22:10
Attached please find Pilgrim Watch Comment Regarding Additional Requirements For Containment Venting Systems For BWRs With Mark I And Mark II Containments In Support Of Filters And Rupture Discs prepared for the NRC Commissioners that will vote on whether or not to require filters and rupture discs on vents used to relieve pressure from the containment in a severe accident.
In a severe accident the amount of radioactivity released offsite from an unfiltered vent would be very large and damaging. It makes no sense not to add a filter to protect our families and property from contamination. Filtered systems are available, tested and in use today - for example in Sweden, Germany, France, Switzerland and will be installed in Slovenia and Japan that learned the hard way the danger of not requiring filters and rupture discs before the accident.
Rupture discs are necessary so that neither water nor electrical supply is needed and operator intervention is not necessary to actuate the venting system to save containment in a pressure buildup.
Lessons learned from Fukushima showed the importance of requiring reactors designed like Mark I & II’s in the U.S. to install filtered DTV’s in order to:
· Protect public health in the event that it is necessary to release.
· Assure operators follow orders to open the vent. As in Japan, properly trained operators here are likely to decide not to open the DTV when they should because they fear the effects offsite of significant unfiltered releases.
As part of the Fukushima Lessons Learned Task Force, NRC Staff assigned to study whether to recommended filtering, did do (November 2012). It only made sense when considering that during normal operations and design based accidents gaseous releases are filtered but they are not filtered during severe accidents when the releases offsite will be the greatest.
Please consider contacting the NRC Commissioners in support of the attached comments ASAP; and also alert your members and elected officials to do the same. I attached a word version for your convenience.
Vents affect all Mark I and Mark II BWRS that includes: Mark I BWR Reactors: Browns Ferry 1, 2 & 3 (AL); Brunswick 1 & 2 (NC); Cooper 1 (NE) Dresden 2 & 3 (Il); Duane Arnold 1 (IA); Fermi 2 (MI); Fitzpatrick 1 (NY); Hatch 1 & 2 (GA); Hope Creek 1 (NJ); Monticello 1 (MN); Nine Mile Point 1 (NY); Oyster Creek 1 (NJ); Peach Bottom 2 & 3 (PA) ; Pilgrim 1 (MA); Quad Cities 1 & 2 (IL); Vermont Yankee 1 (VT). Mark II BWR Reactors: Columbia (WA); LaSalle, 1&2 (IL); Limerick 1 &2 (PA); Nine Mile (NY); Susquehanna, 1&2(PA)
Pilgrim Watch, Director
148 Washington Street Duxbury, MA 02332
SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2 _ NRC BASELINE SECURITY INSPECTION REPORT O5OOO387/201 2405 AND 05000388/2012405